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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the Illinois judicial system was con-
fronted with a variety of situations that required the application of
the comparative fault doctrine. The result was a clarification of the
scope and effect of this and other doctrines. Clarification, however,
was not the court's only response. The Illinois Supreme Court
abolished the doctrines of secondary assumption of risk and im-
plied indemnity, both of which have confused members of the Illi-
nois legal system for a long period of time. The Illinois Supreme
Court also ruled on the constitutionality of the Medical Malprac-
tice Act. Finally, the Illinois courts addressed certain controver-
sial aspects of both the Structural Work Act and the Dram Shop
Act. The Tort Reform Act was the most significant statutory de-
velopment in the area of torts during the Survey period. A synop-
sis here, however, would not suffice; instead, an in-depth discussion
of the Act will follow this article.
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Comparative Fault
In Alvis v. Ribar, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
total justice can be attained only when the law apportions damages
according to the relative fault of the parties.2 Accordingly, the
court in Alvis adopted the doctrine of pure comparative fault.3
Under this doctrine, "the parties may recover damages not attribu-
table to their own fault."4 Though the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted comparative fault as the method by which damages would
be determined in negligence actions, numerous issues remained un-
clear. Several issues concerning the application of comparative
fault were addressed during the Survey year, including the burden
of proof, the application of assumption of risk in negligence ac-
tions, and the extension of comparative principles in strict liability.
1. Burden of Proof Regarding Plaintiff's Fault
The defendant has the burden of proving the plaintiff's negli-
1. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
2. Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
3. See supra note 1.
4. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 16, 421 N.E.2d at 892. The doctrine of pure comparative fault
affected many areas of procedural law, including the burden of proof. See infra notes 6-
13 and accompanying text.
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gence in a comparative fault case.5 In Casey v. Baseden,6 the jury
instructions provided that if the jury found the defendants liable
and found that their conduct caused the plaintiff to sustain dam-
ages, then the defendants must prove the plaintiff's contributory
negligence to diminish the plaintiff's recovery.7 The plaintiff in
Casey was injured when the defendant's truck collided with the
rear of the plaintiff's automobile.' The jury found that the defend-
ant had been negligent and that the plaintiff was thirty percent at
fault. 9
After the appellate court affirmed,'° the defendants appealed the
jury's decision, arguing that the instructions confused the burden
of proof on the question of liability with the burden of proof on the
issue of damages.II On appeal, the supreme court held that the
jury was instructed adequately regarding the burden of proof.'2
The Casey court stated that the defendant must persuade the trier
of fact that the plaintiff was negligent because it is the defendant
who stands to benefit from that showing.' 3 Prior to Casey, a ma-
jority of the defense bar had assumed the burden by going forward
with the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The Casey deci-
sion laid to rest any vestige of the dispute regarding which party
bears the burden.
5. Casey v. Baseden, 111 I11. 2d 341, 347, 490 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1986). According to the
Illinois Supreme Court in Casey, the decision in Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886, sup-
ports the holding that a defendant carries the burden of proving the plaintiff's negligence
in a comparative fault case. Casey, 111 111. 2d at 346-47, 490 N.E.2d at 6. A rationale for
this burden is that a plaintiff's comparative fault is similar, in effect, to the defense of
failure to mitigate damages: it does not defeat the cause of action, but only diminishes
plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 347, 490 N.E.2d at 6. The defendant has the burden of prov-
ing failure to mitigate, Rozny v. Masnul, 43 I11. 2d 54, 73, 250 N.E.2d 656, 666 (1969),
and should, likewise, carry the burden of proving plaintiff's negligence. Casey, 111Ill1. 2d
at 347, 490 N.E.2d at 6.
6. 111 I1. 2d 341, 490 N.E. 2d 4.
7. Id. at 344, 490 N.E.2d at 5. The jury instructions stated "[i]f you find for the
plaintiffs on the issue of liability, and find that the plaintiffs have proven that they have
sustained damages, then the defendants have the burden of proving that the plaintiff, Kay
Casey, was contributorily negligent." Id.
8. Id. at 343, 490 N.E.2d at 5.
9. Id. at 343-44, 490 N.E.2d at 5. The plaintiff and her husband sued the defendant,
alleging negligence and loss of consortium. Id. at 343, 490 N.E.2d at 5.
10. Id. at 344, 490 N.E.2d at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 347, 490 N.E.2d at 7.
13. Id. at 346, 490 N.E.2d at 6. The court stated that "both logic and fairness dictate
that the defendant, who stands to benefit from a showing that the plaintiff was negligent,
should have the burden of persuading the trier of fact on that issue." Id. The Casey
court relied heavily on the Maine Supreme Court case of Crocker v. Coombs, 328 A.2d
389 (Me. 1974). In Crocker, the court held that the adoption of comparative fault re-
quired the defendant to prove the plaintiff's negligence. Crocker, 328 A.2d at 392.
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2. Abolition of Secondary Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk has operated as a complete bar to a plain-
tiff's recovery in negligence law.14 The doctrine has developed in
both implied15 and express forms.' 6 Under the implied form of as-
sumption of risk, the court assesses the parties' conduct to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff was willing to assume a known risk.
17
The implied form of the doctrine of assumption of risk has been
further subdivided into primary and secondary categories.' 8 The
primary label applies to situations in which the plaintiff has as-
sumed known risks inherent in a particular activity or situation. 19
The nature of the activity creates the assumed risk; plaintiff's neg-
14. Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433, 481 N.E.2d 1037,
1041 (1st Dist. 1985). A vast majority of states have either abolished or severely limited
the assumption of risk defense following their adoption of comparative fault. See, e.g.,
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61 (Alaska 1968); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark.
406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Segoviano v. Housing Authority, 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191
Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983); Brown v. Kreuser, 38 Colo. App. 554, 560 P.2d 105 (1977); Wend-
land v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 462 A.2d 1043 (1983);
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Burrows v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 49 Ha-
waii 351, 417 P.2d 816 (1966); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Smith
v. Blakey, 213 Kan. 91, 515 P.2d 1062 (1973); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me.
1976); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, par. 85 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1974); Melendres v. Soales,
105 Mich. App. 73, 306 N.W.2d 399 (1981); lepson v. Noren, 308 N.W.2d 812 (Minn.
1981); Yarbrough v. Phipps, 285 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1973), Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field
Services, Inc., 650 P.2d 772 (Mont. 1982); Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641
(1962); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959);
Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411
(McKinney 1976); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974); Hirschbach v. Cincin-
nati Gas & Electric Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 206, 452 N.E.2d 326 (1983); Minor v. Zidell Trust,
618 P.2d 392 (Okla. 1980); Thompson v. Weaver, 277 Or. 299, 560 P.2d 620 (1977);
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198
(1981); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Meese v. Brigham Young
University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981); Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 390 A.2d
398 (1978); Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973);
McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 15 Wisc.2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981).
15. See infra notes 17-40 and accompanying text.
16. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 481 N.E.2d at 1041. Under express assumption of
risk, the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries caused by risks inherent in the situation or
dangers created by the defendant's negligence because the plaintiff and defendant explic-
itly agree the defendant owes no legal duty to the plaintiff. Id. The defendant, however,
may be held liable if the court finds his conduct wanton, wilful or reckless, or if the
damages arise from an agreement deemed contrary to public policy. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 68, at 439-45 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 481 N.E.2d at 1041.
18. Id.
19. Id. See, e.g., Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966)
(second baseman's ankle broken by runner's hard slide); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn.
448, 147 N.W.2d 587 (1966) (plaintiff injured in collision with defendant while ice
skating).
ligence need not be alleged.2" Primary implied assumption of risk
appears not to be a negligence defense because this defense is not
used in response to complaints alleging negligence. E'
Secondary implied assumption of risk, however, has tradition-
ally barred recovery in a negligence action.22 When this defense is
raised, defendant alleges that "the plaintiff implicitly assume[d] the
risks created by the defendant's negligence. ' 23 Similar to contribu-
tory negligence, secondary implied assumption of risk bars recov-
ery.24 Accordingly, critics have argued for its abolition.25 These
critics maintain that comparative negligence, which effectively
abolished contributory negligence,26 should also abolish secondary
implied assumption of risk.27 If these recommendations were ac-
cepted, comparative negligence would prevent assumption of risk
from operating as a complete bar to recovery in negligence
actions.28
Following a Survey year decision, implied assumption of risk no
longer bars a plaintiff's recovery in a negligence action.29 The court
in Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club3 ° noted that comparative
fault31 abolished the doctrine of secondary implied assumption of
risk. 2 In Duffy, a professional golfer participating in a tournament
hit a golf ball that struck the plaintiff-spectator, causing injury to
her right eye.33 In response to the plaintiff's complaint alleging
negligence, the defendants, Midlothian Country Club and the
20. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 481 N.E.2d at 1041.
21. Id. See generally Kionka, Implied Assumption of Risk- Does it Survive Compara-
tive Fault?, 1982 S. ILL. L.J. 371.
22. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 481 N.E.2d at 1041. Courts traditionally have
upheld secondary implied assumption of risk as a valid negligence defense if plaintiff's
knowledge and volition could be proven. Id. See, e.g., Bugh v. Webb, 231 Ark. 27, 328
S.W.2d 379 (1959); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329
(1977).
23. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 481 N.E.2d at 1041.
24. Id. See supra note 21.
25. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 481 N.E.2d at 1041.
26. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
27. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 481 N.E.2d at 1041-42.
28. Id. at 434, 481 N.E.2d at 1042.
29. Id. at 435, 481 N.E.2d at 1042.
30. 135 Ill. App. 3d 429, 481 N.E.2d 1037 (1st Dist. 1985).
31. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. See also Prewein v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 141, 483 N.E.2d 224 (1985) (comparative negligence does not apply to
the conduct of a plaintiff bringing an action under the Structural Work Act). See also
infra notes 310-19 and accompanying text.
32. Duffy, 135 11. App. 3d at 435, 481 N.E.2d at 1043. The court did not find that
comparative fault affected express assumption of risk, under which the plaintiff explicitly
assumes the inherent risks created by defendant's negligence. Id.
33. Id. at 431, 481 N.E.2d at 1040.
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Western Golf Association,34 argued that the plaintiff voluntarily
had assumed a known risk and, therefore, was barred from recov-
ery.35 On remand,36 the plaintiff's damages were reduced by ten
percent because the jury found her ten percent negligent.37
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District affirmed the
trial court and held that the doctrine of comparative fault abol-
ished the doctrine of secondary implied assumption of risk.38
Therefore, a plaintiff's implied assumption of risk, created by the
defendant's negligence, will no longer bar recovery in negligence
actions.39 Rather, plaintiff's assumption of risk will aid the finder
of fact in determining what percentage of the damages plaintiff
may recover." The complex issue of implied assumption of risk
was further complicated by the Alvis decision. Though the Duffy
holding does not resolve all related issues, it does provide some
guidance. The Duffy decision is consistent with the trend towards
the wide ranging application of comparative fault principles.
3. Products Liability Developments
As previously noted, the Illinois Supreme Court has been called
upon to clarify and refine the application of comparative fault to a
wide variety of situations. In 1983, the court held that compara-
tive fault principles applied to the apportionment of damages in
strict products liability cases.41 The decision in Coney v. J.L. G.
Industries, Inc. ,42 generally was interpreted as retaining misuse and
34. Id. at 432, 481 N.E.2d at 1040. The complaint also named the Professional Golf-
ers Association ("PGA") and the golfer who struck the plaintiff as defendants in the same
action. The PGA subsequently was dismissed on plaintiff's motion. The complaint
against the golfer went to the jury, which found for him and against the plaintiff. Id. at
432 n.1, 481 N.E.2d at 1040 n.l.
35. Id. at 432, 481 N.E.2d at 1040.
36. At the trial court level, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. On an initial
appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that the defendants had a duty of care
toward spectators as business invitees and that the applicable standard of reasonable care
was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Duffy, 92 Ill. App. 3d 193, 415 N.E.2d 1099
(1st Dist. 1980).
37. Duffy, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 432, 481 N.E.2d at 1040.
38. Id. at 435, 481 N.E.2d at 1043. The appellate court determined that comparative
fault affected neither express assumption of risk nor primary implied assumption of risk
because "these branches of the assumption of risk doctrine [were] neither analytically nor
functionally similar to contributory negligence .. " Id. at 435, 481 N.E.2d at 1042.
39. Id. at 435-36, 481 N.E.2d at 1043.
40. Id. at 436, 481 N.E.2d at 1043.
41. Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119, 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (1983).
42. Id. In Coney, the supreme court ruled that a plaintiff's assumption of risk or
misuse is merely a factor in the apportionment of damages, rather than a bar to recovery.
Id. at 119, 454 N.E.2d at 204. The Coney court relied on Williams v. Brown Manufactur-
ing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), in which the court held misuse and as-
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assumption of risk as defenses to strict products liability claims.
Under Coney, the defenses were to be compared to defendant's
contribution and would not act as a total bar to plaintiff's recov-
ery. Additionally, Coney was relied upon for the proposition that a
plaintiff's ordinary negligence was not to be compared in any way,
just as contributory negligence was not applicable in strict liability
prior to Alvis. Thus, Coney clearly ruled out negligent omissions
on the part of a plaintiff, but left some doubt regarding negligent
acts or omissions.
The doctrine of comparative fault does not require consideration
of contributory fault in a products liability action.43 In Simpson v.
General Motors Corp.," the decedent died from injuries suffered
while operating an earth scraper which overturned on an icy hill.45
The earth scraper was designed and manufactured by the defend-
ant, General Motors ("GM"), and was sold to the decedent's em-
ployer by the other defendant, Midco Sales and Service
("Midco").46 At trial, the plaintiff, as administrator of the dece-
dent's estate, introduced expert testimony that the earth scraper
was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a roll-over protec-
tive structure.47 Moreover, the evidence showed that the decedent
was aware of the risk created by the absence of this structure.48
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both GM and
Midco.4 9 The defendants filed cross-claims for indemnification
against each other.5 The circuit court directed a verdict in favor
of Midco and against GM. 1
On appeal, GM contended that limiting the consideration of de-
cedent's comparative fault to his misuse of the product and as-
sumption of risk, defeated the purpose of the comparative fault
sumption of risk were complete defenses to a strict products liability action, but that
contributory negligence is not. The Williams court implied that one who is contributorily
negligent is much less culpable than one who assumes the risk or misuses a product. Id.
at 425-26, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
43. Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 108 Ill. 2d 146, 152, 483 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1985).
See also Anton v. Cogan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 475 N.E.2d 817 (1984) (compara-
tive fault does not require consideration of contributory negligence in a products liability
action in which decedent was crushed to death by road scraper).
44. 108 Ill. 2d 146, 483 N.E.2d 1 (1985).
45. Id. at 148, 483 N.E.2d at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The jury found the plaintiff-decedent assumed part of the risk, attributing
95% of the fault to the defendants and 5% to the decedent. Id.
50. Id. at 148, 483 N.E.2d at 2.
51. Id.
1986]
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doctrine.5 2 GM also argued that under Coney,5 all of the dece-
dent's contributory negligence, except his failure to discover the
defect, should reduce the plaintiff-decedent's recoverable damages
in this strict tort liability action.54 GM contended that the applica-
tion of comparative negligence did not conflict with any principle
of strict liability in tort."5
The supreme court disagreed with GM's arguments. 56 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, Coney held that a "consumer's unob-
servant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward failure to discover or
guard against a defect should not be compared as a damage-reduc-
ing factor." '57 Relying on this interpretation of Coney, the supreme
court in Simpson ruled that the doctrine of comparative fault does
not require consideration of contributory negligence in a products
liability case.5"
Justice Ryan dissented, stating that the majority's decision al-
lowed plaintiffs to recover damages for injuries partially caused by
their own conduct. 59 A vast majority of the jurisdictions that have
considered whether comparative fault principles should be applied
in products liability cases have concluded the principles are appli-
cable.' In those jurisdictions, when a plaintiff's injury arises from
a defective product, his conduct that contributed to the injury
52. Id. at 149, 483 N.E.2d at 2. GM argued that the purpose of the comparative fault
doctrine was to avoid inconsistent and inequitable results. Id.
53. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
54. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 149, 483 N.E.2d at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 152, 483 N.E.2d at 3.
57. Id. (citing Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 119, 454 N.E.2d at 204). See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
58. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 152, 483 N.E.2d at 3 (citing Coney, 97 Ill.2d 104, 454
N.E.2d 197). In an amicus curiae brief, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
and the Product Liability Advisory Council, argued that applying comparative fault to
strict products liability cases advances the fundamental goals of tort law. Simpson, 108
Ill. 2d at 149, 483 N.E.2d at 2.
59. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 160, 483 N.E.2d at 7 (Ryan, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of damages when plaintiff injured in car accident while not wearing seat belt, see
infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
60. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 154, 483 N.E.2d at 4 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Not all states
have considered the applicability of contributory negligence in strict liability cases. The
following states have declined to apply comparative negligence or fault principles in strict
liability actions: Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
The vast majority of those states considering the applicability of comparative negli-
gence theory in strict liability cases have found comparative negligence theory applicable:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Coney, 97 Ill. 2d at 112-14, 454 N.E.2d at 201.
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reduces his award. 6' Justice Ryan asserted that the majority had
deviated from the concept of pure comparative fault previously
adopted in Alvis v. Ribar.62 Justice Ryan stated that the court
should avoid carving out exceptions to the pure comparative fault
doctrine.63 Following Simpson, the court has made it clear that no
form of negligent act or omission will be compared to defendant's
contribution.
B. Negligent Entrustment
The Illinois Supreme Court seldom has analyzed the cause of
action of negligent entrustment. During the Survey period, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Teter v. Clemens64 examined this cause of
action, clarifying the conduct required on the part of the defend-
ant. If for no other reason than the paucity of decisions in this
area, the supreme court's decision in Teter will stand out.
Negligent entrustment consists of a lender giving "a dangerous
article to one whom he knows, or should know, is likely to use it in
a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others. ' 65 A
complaint for negligent entrustment is insufficient unless it alleges
conduct by which the instrumentality that caused the injury came
61. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 154, 483 N.E. 2d at 4 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan
agreed with the views of those states that applied comparative principles to strict product
liability actions. Id. See supra note 60. Justice Ryan specifically concurred with the
court's view in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978), that all forms of fault on the part of the plaintiff should be considered in
diminishing his recovery. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 155, 483 N.E.2d at 4-5 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
62. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 159-60, 483 N.E.2d at 7 (Ryan, J., dissenting). See supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
63. Simpson, 108 Ill. 2d at 160, 483 N.E.2d at 7 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Other prod-
ucts liability cases decided by Illinois courts during the Survey period include Kramer v.
Weedhopper of Utah, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 217, 490 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1986) (defend-
ant's provision of 90% of allegedly defective bolts sufficient circumstantial evidence to
overcome defendant's motion for a summary judgment); Rivera v. Mahogany Corp., 145
Ill. App. 3d 213, 494 N.E.2d 660 (1st Dist. 1986) (defendant "financial" lessor not within
distributive chain of product leased and not subject to imposition of strict tort liability);
Tennant v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 28, 492 N.E.2d 632 (1st Dist.
1986) (comparative-negligence principles include both proximate cause and foreseeabil-
ity); Mason v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 511, 487 N.E.2d 1043 (1st Dist.
1985) (summary judgment appropriate when defendant-manufacturer's product was safe
for intended purpose and no material question existed regarding dangerous design of
product) Skarski v. Act-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 138 Ill. App. 3d 301, 485 N.E.2d
1312 (1st Dist. 1985) (summary judgment for the defendant improper when defendant,
though not manufacturer, is in distributive chain and liable for injuries resulting from
defects in trailer).
64. 112 Ill. 2d 252, 492 N.E.2d 1340 (1986).
65. 15 DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 23.01, at 613 (1982).
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into the defendant's possession.66 In Teter, the five-year old plain-
tiff was shot with a gun by the defendants' five-year old grandson.67
The plaintiff asserted two alternative theories for recovery: 68 negli-
gent entrustment, and the presence of a dangerous condition on the
defendants' premises.69
In addressing the negligent entrustment issue, the court stated
that for liability in a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish
that his injury was caused by the defendant's fault.71 In Teter, al-
lowing the child to possess the gun was the basis of the defendant's
fault.71 The complaint, however, failed to allege conduct by the
defendants which made the child's possession of the gun possible.72
Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state
a cause of action for negligent entrustment.73
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, however, held
a cause of action for negligent entrustment was set forth in Luethi
v. Yellow Cab Co..74 Luethi involved an action for injuries alleg-
edly sustained by the plaintiff when she was a passenger in a vehi-
cle owned by the defendant cab company and driven by a
66. Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59, 492 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (1986).
67. Id. at 255, 492 N.E.2d at 1341.
68. Id. at 256, 492 N.E. 2d at 1342. In a third count, the plaintiff sought to set aside
an earlier release of his claims against the defendant on the ground of mutual mistake.
Id.
69. Id. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of plaintiff's count
for premises liability which alleged the injury resulted from the failure of the defendants
to warn of the alleged danger or to take adequate precautions against it. Id. at 260, 492
N.E.2d at 1343-44. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because the allegations
failed to show facts that would cause the presence of such a duty. Id.
Several Illinois cases have considered the issue of premises liability. See, e.g., Wright v.
Mr. Quick Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 236, 486 N.E.2d 908 (1985) (defendant-lessor of lot owed no
duty in tort to plaintiff who fell in parking lot of her employee-lessee); Larson v. City of
Chicago, 142 Ill. App. 3d 81, 491 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1986) (defendant city owed duty
to maintain sidewalks in reasonably safe condition for all foreseeable uses including roll-
erskating); Lohan v. Walgreens Co., 140 I11. App. 3d 171, 488 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist.
1986) (defendant vendor not liable for natural accumulations of moisture and under no
duty to continue voluntary undertaking to remove accumulations); Zimring v. Wendrow,
137 Ill. App. 3d 847, 485 N.E.2d 478 (2d Dist. 1985) (defendant homeowners had no
duty to prevent social guests from assaulting the plaintiff-licensee on defendant's property
under "premises doctrine"); St. Phillips v. O'Donnell, 137 Ill. App. 3d 639, 484 N.E.2d
1209 (2d Dist. 1985) (operator of tavern owed no duty to protect patron from negligent
or intentional harmful acts of third persons when decedent knew of violent propensities
of third person and assault occurred on common parking area of shopping center); Wal-
ton v. Spidle, 137 Ill. App. 3d 249, 484 N.E. 2d 469 (4th Dist. 1985) (tavern owner not
liable for injury occurring after plaintiff left premises).
70. Teter, 112 2d at 258, 492 N.E.2d at 1343.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 136 11. App. 3d 829, 834, 483 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1st Dist. 1985).
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company's lessee." The plaintiff sought damages from the cab
company because it had leased a taxi to a driver76 whom it knew
possessed no public chauffeur license.77
The plaintiff sought to establish wilful and wanton conduct on
the part of the cab company.7" The plaintiff, however, failed to
allege that the cab company aggravated or approved of the driver's
conduct. 79 Instead, the complaint alleged only that the cab com-
pany's wilful disregard for the plaintiff proximately caused her
injuries.8 0
Although the complaint failed to contain allegations sufficient to
support the action plaintiff sought to establish, the court held that
the allegations did set forth a cause of action for negligent entrust-
ment."1 The cab company's entrustment of the car to the unli-
censed driver was, in effect, an entrustment of the car to an
incompetent driver and, therefore, an independent act of negli-
gence. 2 In addition, the negligence of the unlicensed driver pro-
vided a causal connection between the negligence of the cab
company, who negligently entrusted, and the plaintiff, who was in-
jured. 3 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint
stated a valid cause of action. 4
75. Id. at 830, 483 N.E.2d at 1059. The defendant cab company's lessee also was
named as a defendant. Id.
76. Id. The driver was a co-defendant. Id.
77. Id. at 833, 483 N.E.2d at 1060. The complaint alleged that the lack of a proper
license violated provisions of the Municipal Code of Chicago and city regulations. Id.
78. Id. at 833, 483 N.E.2d at 1061.
79. Id. (citing Samuels v. Checker Taxi Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 63, 382 N.E.2d 424 (1st
Dist. 1978)). The court in Samuels held that in order to establish wilful and wanton
conduct on the part of the cab company, plaintiff must allege that the cab company ag-
gravated or approved of the driver's conduct. Samuels, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 66-68, 382
N.E.2d at 425-27.
80. Luethi, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 833, 483 N.E.2d at 1061.
81. Id. at 834, 483 N.E.2d at 1061 (citing Seward v. Griffin, 116 Ill. App. 3d 749, 452
N.E.2d 558 (3d Dist. 1983)). In Seward, the plaintiffs were injured when their van was
struck by a vehicle driven by an unlicensed driver. The evidence established that the
defendant had supplied the driver with the car knowing that he was unlicensed. The
court held the defendant liable on a negligent entrustment theory of liability. Seward,
116 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 452 N.E.2d at 563.
82. Seward, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 754-55, 452 N.E.2d at 563. See, e.g., Kinney v. Smith,
95 Idaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 (1973); Hardwick v. Bublitz, 119 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa 1963);
Anthony v. Covington, 187 Okla. 27, 100 P.2d 461 (1940); Barnes v. Zinda, 464 S.W.2d
501 (Tex. Cir. App. 1971); Mundy v. Pirie Slaughter Motor Co., 206 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.
1947).
83. Luethi, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 834, 483 N.E.2d at 1061 (citing Seward, 116 Ill. App.
3d at 754-55, 452, N.E.2d at 563).
84. Luethi, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 834, 483 N.E. 2d at 1061. The Luethi court noted that
when a complaint states a good cause of action, even one not contemplated by the plain-
tiff, it should not be dismissed. Id. at 833, 483 N.E.2d at 1060 (citing Browning v. Heri-
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C, Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is an essential element that must be proven in
order to invoke tort liability and collect damages.85 Two Illinois
appellate court cases, which may be characterized as proximate
cause "landmark decisions," were decided during the Survey year:
Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital86 and
Kemp v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis."
In Northern Trust Co., the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District recognized the strain placed on plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice cases in which many factors have contributed to the ulti-
mate injury. The court noted that when multiple causes or factors
exist, a determination of the exact degree of contribution of any
one may well be impossible. Thus, when there is evidence that a
defendant has contributed to increase the risk of harm to the plain-
tiffs and the harm in fact was sustained, the court in Northern
Trust Co. concluded that the plaintiff has provided sufficient evi-
dence to present the matter to the trier of fact.88
In Northern Trust Co., the guardian of the estate of a severely
brain-damaged baby sought money damages for the child's inju-
ries.89 The child's parents also sought compensation for past and
future medical expenses. 90 The suit named as defendants Weiss
Hospital, the pediatrician, and the two registered nurses who had
been working in the newborn nursery during the time when the
child's condition deteriorated.9' The trial court found the child's
injuries resulted from his failure to receive adequate post-delivery
care.92 The court, however, found only one of the defendants,
Weiss Memorial Hospital, liable.93
Weiss Memorial Hospital appealed the verdict on behalf of the
child's estate, based on the issue of proximate cause. 94 The hospi-
tage Insurance Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 947, 338 N.E.2d 912, 915 (2d Dist. 1975)). See
also Salvi v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., 140 Ill. App. 3d 896, 489 N.E.2d 394 (1st
Dist. 1986) (defendant-retailer owed duty to plaintiff-buyer injured by fourteen-year old
child, who negligently handled an air gun).
85. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 767 (5th ed. 1981).
86. 143 Ill. App. 3d 479, 493 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1986).
87. 143 Il. App. 3d 360, 493 N.E.2d 372 (3d Dist. 1986).
88. Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d at 488, 493 N.E.2d at 12.
89. Id. at 482, 493 N.E.2d at 8.
90. Id. at 482, 493 N.E.2d at 9.
91. Id. at 484, 493 N.E.2d at 8-9.
92. Id. The standard of care applicable to this case was that which prevailed in 1970,
at the time of the minor's birth. Id. at 484, 493 N.E.2d at 9. The suit was instituted in
1978.
93. Id. at 484, 493 N.E.2d at 8-9.
94. Id. at 484-93, 493 N.E.2d at 9-12. The hospital also appealed the reimbursement
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tal contended that the verdicts in favor of the other defendants
were inconsistent with the verdict against itself.9 The appellate
court addressed this contention by noting that a different standard
of care applied to the hospital than to the other defendants, partic-
ularly the nurse on duty when the minor's condition grew worse. 96
With respect to the hospital's standard of care, there existed a Chi-
cago Board of Health Regulation requiring that "one registered
professional nurse specially trained in the care of newborn and pre-
mature infants supervise each nursery at all times."' 97 Pursuant to
the regulation, if a hospital failed to provide a nurse to supervise
the care of the injured child, it deviated from its standard of care.98
In contrast, the nurse's standard of care was simply "to possess
and apply the knowledge and use the skill and care that is ordina-
rily used by reasonably well-qualified nurses ... in similar cases
and circumstances." 99 In Northern Trust Co., the nurse was not
"specially-trained" as required pursuant to the regulation; rather,
she was a nurse who worked for the hospital's maternity depart-
ment. °° The appellate court thus determined that the jury prop-
erly could have found that the nurse satisfied her standard of care,
while also finding that the hospital failed to meet its standard by
failing to provide a nurse "specially-trained" within the meaning of
the regulation.101
Furthermore, the appellate court stated that the evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that the hospital's omission proximately
caused the child's injuries.102 The court examined the testimony of
award to the parents. This verdict was reversed because the statute of limitations barred
the action. Id. at 493, 493 N.E.2d at 15 (citing Fess v. Parke, Davis & Co., 113 Ill. App.
3d 133, 135, 446 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (1st Dist. 1983)). The parents cross appealed, con-
tending that the verdict in favor of one nurse was contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. That verdict was affirmed. Northern Trust Co., 143 I11. App. 3d at 493-94, 493
N.E. 2d at 16.
95. Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d at 484, 493 N.E.2d at 9.
96. Id. at 485, 493 N.E.2d at 10.
97. Id. The hospital also contended that the trial court's interpretation of this regula-
tion was erroneous. Id. at 489, 493 N.E.2d at 13. The appellate court, however, found
that the trial court had committed no error. Id.
98. Id. at 485, 493 N.E.2d at 10.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 486, 493 N.E.2d at 12. The appellate court took this opportunity to advo-
cate the adoption of section 323 of the Second Restatement of Torts in medical malprac-
tice actions. Id. at 487-88, 493 N.E.2d at 12 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 323 (1965)). Section 323 states in relevant part:
One who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should recog-
nize as necessary for the protection of the other's person . . . is subject to liabil-
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the plaintiff's expert, who testified that a specially trained nurse, if
provided, would have notified the pediatrician of complications
much earlier than the defendant nurse had notified the defendant
pediatrician.10 3 Plaintiff's expert further testified that if the doctor
had been consulted earlier, the child would have received oxygen
earlier and as a result, the child's respiratory difficulties would
have been less severe. °0 Therefore, the court in Northern Trust Co.
held the jury reasonably could have found the hospital's failure to
provide a nurse, who would have known to consult the physician
earlier in this situation, proximately caused a delay in treatment
which contributed substantially to the child's injuries. °'
In the second "landmark decision," Kemp v. Sisters of the Third
Order of St. Francis, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third Dis-
trict held the creation of a condition which makes an injury possi-
ble will not establish liability when the act of an independent third
party is the proximate cause of injury. 10 6 In Kemp, an indepen-
dently employed nurse knocked over an intravenous ("IV") pole
and an attached glass IV bottle while the plaintiff was lying on the
operating room table.0 7 The IV bottle struck the plaintiff in the
mouth, causing dental injuries.' ° The plaintiff sued the hospital,
alleging that the defendant was negligent in using a hard glass IV
bottle, rather than a soft plastic bag, in the operating room.'° 9 The
trial court granted the defendant's second motion for summary
ity to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if ... his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm .... Id.
103. Northern Trust Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d at 488, 493 N.E.2d at 11.
104. Id. at 488, 493 N.E.2d at 12.
105. Id. See also Tennant v. Clark Equipment Co., Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 28, 492
N.E.2d 632 (1st Dist. 1986) (plaintiff injured when a wrench broke as he attempted to
remove a rusty bolt from a crane; evidence that defendant-crane manufacturer had notice
of alleged design defect in crane and that injury was foreseeable was sufficient to over-
come defendant's motion for summary judgment alleging wrench as sole proximate cause
of injury). For further discussion of comparative fault cases, see supra notes 43-63 and
accompanying text.
106. Kemp v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 143 Ill. App. 3d 360, 361, 493
N.E.2d 372, 373 (3d Dist. 1986). During the Survey period, the Illinois courts decided
several other cases concerning proximate cause. See, e.g., Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 112 Ill. 2d 378, 493 N.E.2d 1022 (1986); Chem-Pac, Inc. v.
Simborg, 145 Ill. App. 3d 520, 495 N.E.2d 1124 (1st Dist. 1986) (defendants' negligence
proximate cause of fire when defendants failed to keep vagrants out, post watchmen, or
remedy building code violations); Mathieu v. Venture Stores, Inc., 144 Ill. App. 3d 783,
494 N.E.2d 806 (1st Dist. 1986) (improper scheduling of work proximate cause of injury
and violation of the Structural Work Act).
107. Kemp, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 493 N.E.2d at 372.
108. Id. at 360-61. 493 N.E.2d at 372.
109. Id. at 361, 493 N.E.2d at 372.
judgment. '10
The appellate court stated that the furnishing of a condition that
makes the injury possible will not establish liability if a subsequent
independent act by a third party causes the injury.'' Given the
series of events, the court determined that the creation of the con-
dition was not the proximate cause of the injury."12 Rather, the
subsequent independent act was considered the intervening cause
that became the proximate cause of the injury." 3 Thus, the appel-
late court in Kemp agreed with the trial court's determination that
the hospital had furnished only the condition of the accident' 4 by
its use of the glass IV bottle."15 The reviewing court concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and held that the
hospital's conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. 1 6 In the continuing debate concerning mere conditions
versus active negligence, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District has further emphasized the significance of independent in-
tervening acts.
D. Liability and Damages
1. The Seat Belt Defense
In Clarkson v. Wright,1"' the Illinois Supreme Court held that in
automobile personal injury litigation, evidence of failure to wear a
seat belt should not be admitted with respect to either the question
of liability or damages. 1 8 In Clarkson, the plaintiff was injured in
110. Id.
11. Id. at 361, 493 N.E.2d at 373 (citing Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 45
N.E.2d 665 (1942)).
112. Kemp, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 493 N.E.2d at 373.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. An additional Illinois case regarding intervening cause was decided during
the Survey period. In Bauer v. City of Chicago, 137 Ill. App. 3d 228, 484 N.E.2d 422 (1st
Dist. 1985), the defendant's failure to strip an officer of his, star and shield the leading
officer to believe he had a right to carry a gun was a mere creation of a passive condition
that made the injury possible. The officer's actions were the intervening cause; therefore,
the condition created by the defendant-city was not the proximate cause of the injury. Id.
at 236, 484 N.E.2d at 427-28.
117. 108 Il1.2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985).
118. Id. at 133-34, 483 N.E.2d at 270. Clarkson was a case of first impression for the
Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 132, 483 N.E.2d at 269. The Illinois appellate courts, on
the other hand, previously had addressed this issue. Id. The rule articulated by the appel-
late courts requires the trier of fact not consider the failure to use seat belts on the issue of
liability. Id. (citing Josel v. Rossi, 7 Il. App. 3d 1091, 288 N.E.2d 677 (1st Dist. 1972)).
The trier of fact, however, may consider the failure to use a seat belt on the issue of
damages if there is sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by his fail-
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a car accident and thereafter sued the defendant for injuries alleg-
edly caused by the defendant's negligence." 9 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff but reduced the award by fifty per-
cent because of the plaintiff's comparative negligence.1 20
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt. 121 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. 122 On appeal,
the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff's failure to use a
seat belt did not cause the accident.1 23  Instead, the court con-
cluded that, at most, the failure to use the seat belt may have in-
creased the severity of plaintiff's injuries. 24
Justice Ryan, in dissent, 25 asserted that under pure comparative
fault, 126 the court must diminish the plaintiff's recovery to the ex-
tent his failure to use an available seat belt contributed to his inju-
ries. "' Justice Ryan argued that a plaintiff should not be awarded
damages for injuries aggravated by his own failure to wear a seat
belt. 128
ure to use a seat belt. Id. (citing Eichorn v. Olson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 587, 335 N.E.2d 774
(3d Dist. 1975)). See also Hukill v. DiGregorio, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 484 N.E.2d 795
(2d Dist. 1985) (failure of motorcycle rider to wear protective helmet held inadmissible
regarding liability and/or damages absent a statutory requirement to wear a helmet).
119. Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at 130, 483 N.E.2d at 268.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 132, 483 N.E.2d at 269.
124. Id. The court recognized plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages once an injury
occurs. Id. at 133, 483 N.E.2d at 270. This duty, however, arises after the injury. In
contrast, the act of putting on a seat belt occurs before the injury is sustained. Id.
125. Id. at 134-40, 483 N.E.2d at 270-73 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
126. For a discussion of comparative fault, see supra notes 1-63 and accompanying
text.
127. Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at 134-35, 483 N.E.2d at 270. Justice Ryan referred to
Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), in which the court held that parties
are permitted to recover damages provided those damages are "not attributable to their
own fault." Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at 135-36, 483 N.E.2d at 271 (citing Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at
16, 421 N.E.2d at 892).
128. Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at 136, 483 N.E.2d at 271. Justice Ryan qualified this
statement by adding that "a plaintiff should not be permitted to recover damages brought
about by his failure to wear a seat belt if a reasonably prudent person would be expected
to use a seat belt under similar circumstances." Id. While the Clarkson appeal was pend-
ing, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 83-1507, which is consistent with
the majority's opinion. The relevant section of that Act provides:
(c) Failure to wear a seat belt in violation of this section shall not be consid-
ered evidence of negligence, shall not limit the liability of the insurer, and shall
not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or operation of a motor vehicle.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 12-603.1 (1985).
At the time of the Clarkson decision, the court had not yet passed on the constitution-
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2. The Moorman Economic Loss Doctrine
Under the Moorman Economic Loss Doctrine ("Moorman Doc-
trine"), one is unable to recover in tort for purely economic loss. ' 29
A cause of action for purely economic loss fails to allege personal
injury or damage to property; and the damage must be to property
other than the defective product.'30 If a plaintiff's complaint is
based solely on qualitative defects, and therefore a purchaser's dis-
appointed expectations, then contract law, as opposed to tort law,
applies.' Tort theory, however, is appropriate when a party sues
for "personal injury or property damage resulting from a sudden
or dangerous occurrence." 132
The supreme court examined the Moorman Doctrine in Scott &
Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. ,33 The issue for the court's
determination was whether the Moorman Doctrine prohibited the
plaintiffs' action in tort. 134 The court concluded that the alleged
losses fell outside the definition of pure economic loss and therefore
were properly recoverable under a tort theory.' 35
ality of this provision. Clarkson, 108 Ill. 2d at 139, 493 N.E.2d at 273. In Justice Ryan's
opinion, the new provision conflicted with an earlier provision which required the wear-
ing of seat belts. Id. at 139-40, 493 N.E.2d at 273 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The allegedly
conflicting provision of Public Act 83-1507, approved January 8, 1985, effective July,
1985, provided that: "(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle oper-
ated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat
safety belt; .... (d)A violation of this Section shall be a petty offense and subject to a fine
not to exceed $25." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 12-603.1 (1985).
Justice Ryan argued that a violation of this statutory duty should at least be considered
as evidence of plaintiff's failure to act as a reasonably prudent person. Clarkson, 108 Ill.
2d at 140, 483 N.E.2d at 273 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
129. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91, 435
N.E.2d 443, 453 (1982). Contrary to Moorman, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
"economic loss is recoverable where one intentionally makes false representations."
Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 287, 402 N.E.2d 599, 601 (1980). The
supreme court also has held that economic loss is recoverable where one who is in the
business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions
makes negligent representations. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
130. Moorman Manufacturing Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 451. The Moor-
man court noted that economic loss has been defined as " 'damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits -
without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property .. ' " Id. at 82, 435
N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Note, Economic Laws in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966)).
131. Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 112 Il. 2d 378, 387, 493
N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (1986) (citing Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 82, 435 N.E.2d at 449).
132. Scott & Fetzer Co., 112 Ill. 2d at 388, 493 N.E.2d at 1026 (citing Moorman, 91
Ill. 2d at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 450).
133. 112 Ill. 2d 378, 493 N.E.2d 1022.
134. Id. at 387, 493 N.E.2d at 1025.
135. Id. at 388, 493 N.E.2d at 1026.
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In Scott & Fetzer Co., Montgomery Ward & Company
("Wards") occupied a portion of a large warehouse. 36 Wards con-
tracted with a fire alarm service company. Subsequently, the alarm
system allegedly malfunctioned during a fire. 137 The fire spread
and caused extensive damage to the other portions of the ware-
house belonging to the other tenants.13 When sued by both Wards
and the other tenants, the fire alarm company claimed that under a
tort theory of liability, the plaintiffs could not recover for purely
economic loss.13 9
The defendant maintained that the adjacent tenants' complaints
were insufficient because the alleged harm only affected their ex-
pectations regarding the system's function. 1" Because the adjacent
tenants were seeking damages for the loss of property other than
the defective alarm system,14 ' the court concluded that their
losses'42 were not purely economic. 143 In addition, the complaint
specifically alleged that due to the alarm service company's negli-
gence, a "sudden and dangerous conflagration destroyed their
property."'" Applying the Moorman Doctrine to the facts of this
case, the Scott & Fetzer Co. court concluded the economic loss doc-
trine did not bar recovery. 145
3. Physician's Duty to Warn
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District held that psychiatrists, hospitals, and drug manufacturers
have a duty to warn 146 their patients of the adverse effects of drugs
136. Id. at 382, 493 N.E.2d at 1023.
137. Id. at 382-83, 493 N.E.2d at 1023.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 383, 493 N.E.2d at 1023. See also Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill. App. 3d 60, 484
N.E.2d 780 (1st Dist. 1985) (plaintiffs who suffered only economic loss unable to recover
in negligence against defendant, despite structural defects that rendered home
uninhabitable).
140. Scott & Fetzer Co., 112 Ill. 2d at 387, 493 N.E.2d at 1025.
141. Id. at 388, 493 N.E.2d at 1026.
142. The court in Scott & Fetzer Co. addressed only the adjacent tenants' losses. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. For a discussion of the applicability of tort theory, see supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
145. Id. See also supra note 132 and accompanying text. In addition to holding that
the Moorman Doctrine did not bar recovery, the supreme court held that plaintiffs' com-
plaints were sufficient and a finding that the fire alarm service company proximately
caused the losses reasonably could be supported by the evidence. Scott & Fetzer Co., 112
Ill. 2d at 394, 493 N.E.2d at 1029.
146. A duty to warn implicitly includes a duty to warn adequately. Kirk v. Michael
Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 950 n.1, 483 N.E.2d 906, 910 n.l (1st
[Vol. 18
prescribed to them. 47 The duty to warn implicitly extends to
members of the general public whose injuries are proximately
caused by the failure to warn of these effects. 148
In Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center,149 two psy-
chiatrists ordered drugs for a patient.' Hospital personnel ad-
ministered the drugs and discharged the patient without advising
him of any possible adverse effects.15" ' The patient then consumed
an alcoholic beverage and drove his automobile with the plaintiff as
a passenger. 152 As a result of the drugs and diminishment of the
patient's mental and physical abilities, he lost control of his car, hit
a tree, and injured the plaintiff.'53
The plaintiff sued the drug manufacturers, the psychiatrists, and
the hospital for their failure to warn the patient of the drugs' ad-
verse effects, despite their knowledge of these effects.'5 4 The trial
court dismissed all the claims; the appellate court, however, held
that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action."' The appel-
late court held that prior to the patient's discharge, the hospital
had a duty to warn the patient of the adverse effects of the drugs. 156
The duty, however, arose only if the hospital knew or should have
known of the adverse effects of the drugs. 57
The appellate court in Kirk held that the duty owed to the pa-
tient implicitly extended to the plaintiff in addition to the general
public.'58 In determining whether the defendants owed a legal
duty to the plaintiff, the court considered three factors.'59 First,
Dist. 1985) (citing Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Il1. App. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214,
1230 (1979)).
147. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 483 N.E.2d at 914.
148. Id.
149. 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 906.
150. Id. at 949, 483 N.E.2d at 909.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 949-50, 483 N.E.2d at 909.
153. Id. at 950, 483 N.E.2d at 909-10.
154. Id. at 950, 483 N.E.2d at 910.
155. Id. at 949, 483 N.E.2d at 909.
156. Id. at 954-55, 483 N.E.2d at 913. The appellate court stated: "A patient should
not be discharged from a hospital under circumstances which make the patient unknow-
ingly a potential danger to himself or herself and the public at large, because of drugs
administered by hospital personnel." Id. at 955, 483 N.E.2d at 913.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 956, 483 N.E.2d at 914.
159. Id. at 950, 483 N.E.2d at 910. See infra notes 160-173 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of these factors, see Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348,
356, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (1977); Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d
617, 618 (1974); Barnes v. Washington, 56 Ill. 2d 22, 26, 29, 305 N.E.2d 535, 538, 539
(1973); Meiher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 541, 544-45, 301 N.E.2d 307, 309-10 (1973);
Orrico v. Beverly Bank, 109 Ill. App. 3d 102, 105-06, 440 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1982).
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the court discussed the foreseeability of the defendants' acts or
omissions resulting in an injury to the plaintiff. 160 The court deter-
mined that the patient's consumption of an alcoholic beverage, his
presence with the plaintiff in the automobile, and the negligent
manner in which he drove, were all foreseeable.16 1 Therefore, the
court held that the defendants should have known that their failure
to warn of the adverse effects of the drugs would cause injury to a
member of the general public. 162
Next, the court addressed the magnitude of the burden of guard-
ing against an injury to a member of the public because of a failure
to warn. 163 Because many new drugs are continually introduced
and utilized, the court asserted that the public should be protected
from their varying adverse effects."6 Therefore, the psychiatrists,
hospital, and drug manufacturer had a duty to give an adequate
warning of the drugs' adverse effects.165 This duty implicitly ex-
tended to those who may have been injured as a result of their
failure to warn. 166 The court believed that this duty was not an
undue burden on the defendants in light of the great risks to which
the public was exposed. 67
Finally, the Kirk court examined the public policy considera-
tions involved in the extension of the duty to the general public.' 68
The court stated that the duty in question "simply required a
warning, not control or prevention."1 69 The court expressed a con-
160. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 950, 483 N.E.2d at 910.
161. Id. at 950-51, 483 N.E.2d at 910. The defendants argued that the collision with
the tree was not foreseeable because the patient-driver's consumption of alcohol and neg-
ligent driving constituted superseding intervening causes. Id. at 951, 483 N.E.2d at 910.
The court, however, noted that independent intervening acts will not break the chain of
causation if they were reasonably foreseeable. The court held that such acts were reason-
ably foreseeable absent the applicable warning, and therefore did not break the chain of
causation. Id. at 951, 483 N.E.2d at 910-11.
162. Id. at 951, 483 N.E.2d at 910. Under the court's standard of duty to warn, it was
not essential that the defendants foresee the precise injury nor the precise plaintiff injured
as a result of their failure to warn; "[a] duty may exist to one who is unknown and remote
in time and place." Id. at 950-51, 483 N.E.2d at 910. For a discussion of to whom a duty
is owed, see Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-
55 (1977); Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 380, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503
(1943); Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 103, 197
N.E. 578, 582 (1935); Orrico v. Beverly Bank, 109 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107, 440 N.E.2d 253,
257 (1982).
163. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 951, 483 N.E.2d at 911.
164. Id. at 952, 483 N.E.2d at 911.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 953, 483 N.E.2d at 912.
169. Id.
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cern for persons injured as a result of medical negligence;"' and
thus concluded that in order to protect these victims, "the wrong-
ful acts must be curtailed."' 71 After examining the three relevant
factors, the court concluded that each of the defendants owed a
legal duty to the plaintiff.' Whether the defendants breached
their respective duties was an issue for the trier of fact to determine
upon remand.'73
The court in Kirk determined that the trial court may find the
hospital strictly liable for the plaintiff's injuries.' 74 The court
noted that all of the elements for a products liability action were
present: the case involved a product; the hospital was within the
distributive chain of the product;' 75 the product was unreasonably
dangerous because it was dispensed without adequate warning; the
hospital knew or should have known of the unreasonably danger-
ous condition; the unreasonably dangerous condition existed at the
time the product left the hospital's control; and the failure to warn
was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 1 76
III. INDEMNITY
A. Abolition of Implied Indemnity
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court clarified
third-party actions and their accompanying jury instructions by
abolishing implied indemnity. The rule of comparative negligence
and the principles of apportioning by relative fault have eliminated
the need for adherence to the confusing fiction of active-passive
negligence.
An implied indemnity suit is an ordinary negligence action to
recover damages from an indemnitor.'7 The doctrine of implied
170. Id. at 954, 483 N.E.2d at 912.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 956, 483 N.E.2d at 914. The court noted that the duty of each defendant
to warn was nondelegable. Id. at 955 n.5, 483 N.E.2d at 913 n.5.
173. Id. at 955, 483 N.E.2d at 913. Justice McNamara dissented, stating he believed
that the "plaintiff's injury was not reasonably forseeable and the manufacturers and hos-
pital [had] no duty to warn a nonpatient, nonuser of a prescription drug .... Id. at 960,
483 N.E.2d at 917 (McNamara, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 955-56, 483 N.E.2d at 913-14.
175. Id. at 955 n.6, 483 N.E.2d at 913 n.6. The court noted that hospitals charge
patients for the drugs that they dispense. Therefore, a sale was involved, and the hospital
was clearly within the distribution chain of the product. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Mac-
Neal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 447-53, 266 N.E.2d 897, 899-902 (1980)).
176. Kirk, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 955-56, 483 N.E.2d at 913-14.
177. Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 113 Ill. 2d 26, 33, 495 N.E.2d 496, 500 (1986).
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indemnity is based upon an active-passive distinction. 178 An in-
demnitee's conduct is considered "passive" if the indemnitee was
not contributorily negligent 179 or if the indemnitor squandered the
last clear chance. 80 Under implied indemnity, a party whose con-
duct is considered "active" is denied all forms of relief regardless of
how much the other tortfeasors are at fault.' 8 '
The supreme court noted in the past, parties who were less at
fault could transfer the entire cost of their liability to those who
were more at fault. 18 2 During the Survey period, however, implied
indemnity was held to no longer be a viable doctrine for shifting
the entire cost of tortious conduct from one tortfeasor to an-
other."8 3 In Allison v. Shell Oil Co. , 84 Shell Oil Company ("Shell")
contracted with Strange & Coleman ("S & C") for the latter to
rebuild a catalytic cracker at Shell's refinery.8 5 S & C subcon-
tracted J.J. Wuellner ("Wuellner") to provide scaffolding for the S
& C welders. 8 6 To reach an area which the scaffolding left inac-
cessible, the welders ran a board from the top of the catcracker to
the scaffold. 18 7 The plaintiff, an S & C welder, was injured when he
fell off the board that had slipped while he was standing on it. 88
The plaintiff sued both Shell and Wuellner on two theories:
common law negligence and the Structural Work Act.8 9 Shell and
Wuellner impleaded S & C as a third-party defendant seeking com-
plete indemnification or, in the alternative, contribution. 90 Prior
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Moroni v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 24 Ill. App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d
346 (1st Dist. 1960)).
180. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 495 N.E.2d at 500 (citing Sargent v. Interstate Bak-
eries, Inc., 86 Il1. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1967)).
181. Id. at 34, 495 N.E.2d at 501 (citing Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 27, 421 N.E.2d
886, 898 (1981)). See also Gillette v. Todd, 106 Ill. App. 2d 287, 245 N.E.2d 923 (1969)
(one who is passively negligent may seek indemnity from one whose active negligence
primarily caused the damage or injury).
182. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 31, 495 N.E.2d at 499. But See Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill.
2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973) (indemnity not allowed because negligence of both
tortfeasors was "active").
183. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 35, 495 N.E.2d at 501. Accord Skinner v. Reed Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977) (analogy of active-
passive indemnity to the no-contribution rule held to be inequitable), cert. denied sub
nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 436 U.S.
946 (1978).
184. 113 Ill. 2d 26, 495 N.E.2d 496.
185. Id. at 27, 495 N.E.2d at 497.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 27-28, 495 N.E.2d at 497.
188. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 497.
189. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 497-98 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1985)).
190. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 498. See also Pipes v. American Logging Tool Corp.,
816 [Vol. 18
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to trial, all defendants settled with the plaintiff, but the third-party
claims proceeded to trial to determine each defendant's liability for
the settlement amount.' 9'
The jury was instructed regarding both implied indemnity and
contribution, 92 and found that Shell and Wuellner were entitled
to indemnification from S & C. ' 93 The appellate court reversed the
jury's finding on the grounds that contribution had replaced im-
plied indemnity. 94 On appeal to the supreme court, the defend-
ants contended that implied indemnity remained a viable
alternative to contribution when both a pretort relationship and a
substantial difference in the amount of fault attributable to the
tortfeasors were present."9
The supreme court in Allison noted that active-passive indem-
nity, like contributory negligence,1 96 perpetuated inequality by not
apportioning loss and denying relief to a party whose conduct was
considered "active." 197 The court reasoned that the adoption of
comparative fault 98 and the principles of apportioning have led to
the abolition of implied indemnity.1 99 Because implied indemnity
was no longer a viable doctrine for shifting the entire cost of tor-
tious conduct from one tortfeasor to another, the supreme court
concluded the jury should not have been instructed on the law of
this doctrine.2"
139 Ill. App. 3d 269, 487 N.E.2d 424 (5th Dist. 1985) (Contribution Act intended to
place loss in proportionate amounts on those whose actions proximately cause the
injury).
191. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 498.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 32, 495 N.E.2d at 499.
196. Prior to the adoption of the comparative fault doctrine in Alvis, plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence barred his recovery. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
197. Allison, 113 I11. 2d at 34, 495 N.E.2d at 501.
198. For a discussion of the comparative fault doctrine, see supra notes 1-4 and ac-
companying text. The principles of apportioning also were adopted in Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d
1, 374 N.E.2d 437, and the Illinois Contribution Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-
305 (1979).
199. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 34, 495 N.E.2d at 501. See also Heinrich v. Peabody
International Corp., 139 Ill. App. 3d 289, 486 N.E.2d 1379 (1st Dist. 1985) (Illinois
Contribution Act provided full and fair remedy among parties liable for injuries to plain-
tiff and thus eliminated doctrine of implied indemnity).
200. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 35, 495 N.E.2d at 501. Under the Structural Work Act,
liability would be imposed only if Shell or Wuellner were actually at fault. Id. (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1985)). See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying
text. Additionally, the defendants, Shell and Wuellner, were concerned that if they re-
quested contribution, the jury would consider them liable. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 35, 495
N.E.2d at 501. The court responded that this concern was best voiced to the judge who
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B. Judicial Indemnification
New legislation expanded the representation and indemnifica-
tion of state employees to include judges. The expansion facilitates
two vital policies requisite to the fullest administration of justice:
an unencumbered focus on the merits of a case and the unimpeded
growth of the common law.
This expansion was achieved by inserting a new section in the
paragraph of the Illinois Revised Statutes entitled Representation
and Indemnification of State Employees.2"1 This section provides a
judge who is sued for a decision or an order made in the course of
his or her duties with representation and indemnification." 2 A
judge will be indemnified for all damages awarded, all court costs,
attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses.20 3
C. Public Defender Indemnification
The addition of public defenders to the governmental indemnity
scheme will reduce the fallibility inherent in public office. The en-
larged protection shields public servants and thus promotes unin-
hibited advocacy.
The Indemnity of Public Defender or Assistant Public Defender
Act,2° provides that the county will indemnify a public defender
or assistant public defender for any judgment against him as a re-
sult of injuring a party or a party's property in the course of his
duties.20 5 The duty to indemnify is conditional upon the county
receiving notice of the action against the public defender or assis-
tant public defender in the manner described in the Act. 0 6 The
Act further provides that the county which may be liable may in-
tervene in the action and shall be permitted to appear and
may then instruct the jury regarding its options under the Act. Id. For a discussion of
other cases applying the Structural Work Act, see infra notes 293-339 and accompanying
text.
201. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 1302(d) (1985).
202. Id. The judge is entitled to representation and indemnification regardless of the
plaintiff's theory of recovery. Id.
203. Id. Judges convicted of a crime resulting from intentional misconduct in a trial,
who are sued as a direct result of that misconduct, may receive neither representation nor
indemnification under this amendment. Id.
204. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, para. 301.2 (1985).
205. Id. The public defender is entitled to indemnification under this amendment
unless the injury at issue resulted from the public defender's wilful misconduct. Id.
206. Id. Within 10 days of service of process upon a public defender or assistant
public defender, the public defender must notify the county that the action has been
instituted against him. Id. The notice must be in writing and filed in both the states
attorney's office and the county clerk's office. Id.
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defend.207
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
20 8
During the Survey year, the supreme court ruled on the constitu-
tionality of the Medical Malpractice Act (the "Act"). 2°9 This Act
made a number of significant changes in the Code of Civil Proce-
dure210 concerning medical malpractice actions.2 '
In Bernier v. Burris,2 1 2 the plaintiff' 1 3 challenged the constitu-
tionality of various provisions of the Act and sought to enjoin the
disbursement and expenditure of funds for carrying out these pro-
visions. 2 4 The plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of five parts
of the legislation: the establishment of a system of review panels, 21 5
the provision for the periodic payment of future damages,21 6 the
modification of the collateral source rule,217 the prohibition of pu-
nitive damages, 218 and the limitations on the amount of contingent,
fees.219 These provisions apply to healing art malpractice actions,
which are ordinarily actions against physicians and hospitals, but
also may include actions against other health professionals.220
207. Id.
208. The Illinois courts also addressed legal malpractice during the Survey period.
See, e.g., Sexton v. Smith, 112 Ill. 2d 187, 492 N.E.2d 1284 (1986) (plaintiff-seller of farm
not entitled to malpractice award from attorney who prepared installment contract
concerning real estate but did not obtain security interest for seller in chattels because
parties understood that bank would have first lien on cattle and machinery); Yates v.
Muir, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986) (Illinois courts have no jurisdiction over a
legal malpractice claim against a Kentucky attorney when all legal services for the
Illinois resident were rendered in Kentucky); Makela v. Roach, 142 Ill. App. 3d 827, 492
N.E.2d 191 (2d Dist. 1986) (attorney did not owe a duty of reasonable skill and care to
non-client who was not a direct third-party beneficiary of services rendered); Gelsomino
v. Gorov, 149 I11. App. 3d 809, 502 N.E.2d 264 (1st Dist. 1986) (affidavits of plaintiff's
legal malpractice expert created question of fact by noting defendant's failure to
investigate and present favorable testimony of at least six persons).
209. 1985 Ill. Laws 84-7.
210. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 1-101 to 19c-101 (1985).
211. Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 225, 497 N.E.2d 763, 766 (1986).
212. 113 I11. 2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 763.
213. The plaintiff had standing because she instituted her action in her capacity as
taxpayer. Id. at 226, 497 N.E.2d at 767.
214. Id. Various state officials were named as defendants in the action. Id.
215. Id. See infra notes 221-40 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Illinois'
Medical Malpractice Review Panel Provision: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 275 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Review Panel].
216. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 226, 497 N.E.2d at 767. See infra notes 241-55 and ac-
companying text.
217. Id. See infra notes 256-69 and accompanying text.
218. Id. See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
219. Id. See infra notes 279-92 and accompanying text.
220. Id. at 226-27, 497 N.E.2d at 767. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622
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A. Review Panels
Pursuant to the Act, prior to trying a case for healing-art mal-
practice, a panel, composed of a circuit judge, a practicing attor-
ney, and a health-care professional, must determine the issues of
liability and damages. 22' The parties, however, may unanimously
agree to forego the panels and proceed directly to trial.222
Proceedings before the panel are adversarial; both the parties
and the panel may call and examine witnesses.223 The circuit judge
presides over the proceedings and determines all questions of law,
including matters of evidence. 224 Following the hearing, the panel
renders a written decision: the judge determines the questions of
law and the panel, including the judge, determines the questions of
fact.225  At any time, the parties may unanimously agree to be
bound by the panel's decision.226 In the event such an agreement is
made, the decision of the panel is final and judgment is entered
accordingly.227 If the parties have not agreed to be bound by the
panel's decision, the judge conducts a pretrial conference and the
matter proceeds to trial.228
The supreme court in Bernier held the procedures for review
(1985). The Bernier court noted that its task was not to determine whether a malpractice
crisis existed, but instead to determine whether the legislation in question was constitu-
tional. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230, 497 N.E.2d at 769. Whether a malpractice crisis
existed at all was disputed by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The trial
judge found that there was no crisis and that the provisions challenged were therefore
unnecessary. Id. at 229, 497 N.E.2d at 768.
221. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230, 497 N.E.2d at 769. The legislation also provided
special procedures for maintaining rosters of judges, attorneys, and health-care profes-
sionals from which the parties select the panel members. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1014 (1985)). The legislature further provided time limitations in which the
panel must be formed and render a decision. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230-31, 497 N.E.2d at
769 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1013 (1985)). Additionally, the two nonjudi-
cial members of the panel are compensated. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para, 2-1019(a),(b) (1985)).
222. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1012(b) (1985)).
223. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1016(b) (1985)).
224. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769 (citng ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1016(a) (1985)).
225. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1017(a) (1985)).
226. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231, 497 N.E.2d at 769 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1018(b) (1985)).
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1018(d) (1985)). If the matter pro-
ceeds to trial, the panel judge may not preside, nor may the panel's decision be admitted.
Id. Also, a party who rejects a unanimous decision by the review panel and who does not
prevail on the issue of liability at trial is liable for "the costs, reasonable attorneys' fees
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panels unconstitutional.22 9 Under the provisions, the judge either
acts in his judicial capacity but is forced to share his judicial au-
thority with the nonjudicial members, or is denied his judicial au-
thority and has no greater authority than the other two panel
members. 230 The court held that neither alternative was proper 23'
because of the failure to distinguish between the roles of the judge
and the nonjudicial members. 232  The court concluded that the
judge's factfinding and decision making authority was shared with
the judge and the nonjudicial panel members.2 33 Because the judge
was forced to share his authority with the lawyer and the health-
care professional, the nonjudicial members "were empowered to
exercise a judicial function in violation of sections 1 and 9 of article
VI of the constitution. 2 34  Accordingly, the Bernier court held
that the procedures for review panels were unconstitutional.235
Justice Ryan, dissenting in part, stated the provisions of the Act
clearly separated the judicial and nonjudicial functions of the
panel.236 Justice Ryan noted that in jury trials, the factfinding
and expenses of the prevailing party." Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 231-32, 497 N.E.2d at 769,
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1019(c) (1985)).
229. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 771. See Wright v. Central DuPage
Hospital Association, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 324, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1976), in which the Illi-
nois Supreme Court invalidated a system of medical malpractice screening panels com-
posed of a circuit court judge, an attorney, and a physician. The Wright court held that
the panel procedures violated provisions in the Illinois Constitution concerning the
source of the judicial power and the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Id. at 322, 347
N.E.2d at 739-41 (citing ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 9). Furthermore, the court in Wright
held that these procedures were an unconstitutional burden on the right to a jury trial.
Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13). See also
Blumstein v. Clayton, 139 Ill. App. 3d 611, 487 N.E.2d 1176 (1st Dist. 1985) (provisions
prohibiting stay of administrative review not in violation of equal protection as greater
risk of harm to public presented by sanctioned doctors justifies separate treatment of such
decisions).
230. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 233-34, 497 N.E.2d at 770.
231. Id. at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 770. The Bernier court noted that statutes that call for
the creation of panels consisting of three circuit court judges previously had been held
unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislature lacks the authority to create a new
court. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 770 (citing In re Contest of Election for
Governor, 93 Ill. 2d 463, 444 N.E.2d 170 (1983)).
232. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 770. The Bernier court stated the
review panel problems considered in Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 319, 347 N.E.2d at 738, had not
been sufficiently resolved by the new legislation. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 233, 497 N.E.2d
at 770. See supra note 229.
233. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 770-71.
234. Id. at 233, 497 N.E.2d at 770 (citing Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 322, 347 N.E.2d at
739-40).
235. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 771.
236. Id. at 254, 497 N.E.2d at 780. (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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function has been vested completely in nonjudicial personnel.237
Therefore, he did not view the judge's sharing of factual determina-
tions with the nonjudicial members of the panel as a violation of
judicial authority.238 Justice Ryan asserted that a panel of three
individuals, including one judge, is constitutional if the judicial
functions are clearly separated from the nonjudicial functions.239
Moreover, Justice Ryan opined that the Act clearly had vested the
judicial functions in the judge.2 °
B. Periodic Payment of Damages
The plaintiff in Bernier also challenged the provisions241 of the
Medical Malpractice Act that permit the payment of large awards
of future damages in periodic installments.242 The circuit court
judge found that the provisions denied rights to trial by jury, equal
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Justice Ryan, however, did assert that the section of the Medical Malprac-
tice Act that provides for the assessment of costs and attorneys' fees, is unconstitutional.
Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 255, 497 N.E.2d at 780 (Ryan, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1019(c) (1985)). See infra notes 279-92
and accompanying text. Justice Ryan observed that no limit was placed on the costs and
attorney fees that may be assessed. Accordingly, Justice Ryan asserted that the lack of
restrictions on the potential assessment could divert a party from proceeding to trial with
a meritorious claim. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 255, 497 N.E.2d at 780. In Justice Ryan's
opinion, the costs and fees provision was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the
right to a jury. Id. at 255, 497 N.E. 2d at 781 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
Justice Ryan further questioned the provision found in section 2-1018(d) of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides that "any judge who served on a review panel in the case
may not preside at trial". Id. at 256, 497 N.E.2d at 781 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1018(d) (1985)). Justice Ryan
noted that, although this restriction appeared to be logical, this provision may be a viola-
tion of the court's constitutional powers in light of a recent decision of this court. Ber-
nier, 113 Ill. 2d at 256, 497 N.E.2d at 781 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing People v. Joseph, 113 I11. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986)).
For a critical analysis of the review panels provision and its constitutionality, see gener-
ally Comment, Review Panel, supra note 215. See also Baumgartner v. The First Church
of Christ, Scientist, 141 Ill. App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist.) (allegations of
Christian Science malpractice and negligence in wrongful death action properly dismissed
because Medical Malpractice Act exempts religious treatment) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
317 (1986).
241. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 763 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
paras, 2-1701, 2-1704 (1985)).
242. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 234, 497 N.E.2d at 763. Sections 2-1701 and 2-1704 of the
Code of Civil Procedure do not apply unless an effective election has been made by a
party. Id. at 234-35, 497 N.E.2d at 771 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1705).
An effective election first requires a party to make a timely motion for application of these
provisions. Id. at 235, 497 N.E.2d at 771 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1705).
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protection, and due process as provided by the Illinois Constitu-
tion.243 In addition, the court held that the provisions constituted
special legislation.2
On direct appeal, the supreme court held that the provisions did
not interfere with the right to trial by jury.245 Under these provi-
sions, the jury continues to make all damage computations.246 The
jury, however, is instructed not to reduce the amounts to their
present value; instead, the statute provides the discount factor the
trial court must use.247
The supreme court concluded that the provisions allowing peri-
odic payments in healing art malpractice cases offend neither equal
protection nor constitute special legislation.248 The court deter-
mined that multimillion dollar lump sum awards have had a great
impact on the availability and affordability of bodily injury liability
insurance.249 Moreover, the court noted that these awards have
caused the most severe problems in the areas of products liability
and medical malpractice. 25° The court further recognized that be-
cause large judgments often include future damages, the damages
For a list of other conditions which must be met for an effective election, see ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 110, para. 2-1705 (1985).
If the procedure applies in a case, the trier of fact must compute the future damages
without reducing them to present value. Only future damages to be paid at the present
time require reduction to present value. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 235, 497 N.E.2d at 771.
Under the damages provision, the six percent statutory discount factor only reduces eco-
nomic damages. Id. at 236, 497 N.E.2d at 771 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-
1712 (1985)). " '[E]quivalent lump sum value' is calculated by 'applying the discount
factor, compounded annually, to those elements of damages for future economic loss, and
then adding, without discounting, those elements of damages for future noneconomic
loss .. '" Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 235-36, 497 N.E.2d at 763 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1712 (1985)). If a defendant is liable for a periodic award, he must post
adequate security. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 236, 497 N.E.2d at 772 (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 2-1711 (1985)).
243. Bernier, 113 11. 2d at 236, 497 N.E.2d at 772 (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13).
For standards of determining equal protection challenges, see McDonald v. Board of
Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); and Illinois Housing and Development
Authority v. Van Moter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980). For standards of deter-
mining due process challenges, see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); and Harris v. Manor Health Care Corp., 111111. 2d 350, 489 N.E.2d 1374 (1986).
244. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 236, 497 N.E.2d at 772.
245. Id. at 237, 497 N.E.2d at 772.
246. Id.
247. Id. The court noted that sections 2-1701 and 2-1704 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure are no greater an impediment to the right to a jury trial than a statute setting a
predetermined interest rate for judgments. Id.
248. Id. at 238, 497 N.E.2d at 772-73.
249. Id. at 238, 497 N.E.2d at 773.
250. Id. See Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act, 14 U.L.A. 20 (1986).
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are often spent before the damages are actually incurred."' Thus,
the court reasoned that the legislature could have believed that the
periodic payment of future damages would be an effective way of
preserving awards for when they were needed in the future.252 The
fact that the provisions applied only to medical malpractice actions
was of no consequence according to the Bernier court, because the
legislature may choose to address the problem or problems that it
perceives to be in the most need.25 3 Because the provisions were
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, 254 the court
held they did not violate due process or equal protection. 5
C. Collateral Source Rule
In Bernier, the plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality of
section 2-1205,56 which provided that sums received from collat-
eral sources may be used to reduce a judgment against a tortfeasor
in some circumstances. 257  The statute was limited to negligence
251. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 238-39, 497 N.E.2d at 773. See Comment, Variable Peri-
odic Payment of Damages: An Affirmative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 IOWA L. REV. 138,
143-45 (1978).
252. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 239, 497 N.E.2d at 773.
253. Id. See also Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d
357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) (Chicago Cubs failed to show unconstitutionality of statu-
tory amendment which makes certain nighttime professional sporting events subject to
certain regulations).
254. The inquiry under due process and equal protection challenges is whether the
legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Bernier,
113 I11. 2d at 228, 497 N.E.2d at 768 (citing McDonald v. Board of Election Commission-
ers, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Mekr, 82 Ill. 2d
116, 412 N.E.2d 151 (1980)).
255. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 239, 497 N.E.2d at 773. See supra note 254. The court
also held section 2-1713(b) of the Illinois Revised Statute constitutional. Bernier, 113 Ill.
2d at 241, 497 N.E.2d at 774 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1713(b) (1985)).
This section provided for the distribution of the deceased beneficiary's future installments
among the group of beneficiaries. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 241, 497 N.E.2d at 774. The
court found the method of distribution which limited payments of future damages to the
beneficiaries of the wrongful death constitutional. Id.
The plaintiff also objected to the forms of security that may be required and to the
discharge of tortfeasors upon the posting of adequate security. Id. (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-1710, 2-1718 (1985)). The court noted that different forms of
security may be required and in an appropriate case, the circuit court may require the
payment of a lump sum judgment. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 242, 497 N.E.2d at 774 (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-1710, 2-1708(10) (1985)). The court described the
plaintiff's fears as "speculative" and stated that her objections failed to "rise to the level
of a constitutional infirmity." Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 241-42, 497 N.E.2d at 774.
256. Id. at 242, 497 N.E.2d at 774 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1205
(1985)).
257. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 242, 497 N.E.2d at 774. Traditionally, sums received from
collateral sources are not used to reduce a judgment against a tortfeasor. Id.
actions against hospitals and physicians.25 Under section 2-1205,
benefits received from collateral sources may reduce a judgment up
to one half.259 The circuit judge found, however, that section 2-
1205 violated equal protection and due process, and that it con-
flicted with a federal law.2&°
The supreme court, however, determined that because section 2-
1205 allows for the consideration of sums received from collateral
sources to reduce the plaintiff's judgment, it eliminates certain du-
plicative recoveries. 261 The court further reasoned that elimination
of duplicative recoveries was rationally related to the legitimate
governmental interest of reducing the cost of malpractice actions
and thus did not violate equal protection.262 Moreover, the
supreme court concluded that the modification of the collateral
source rule did not offend due process.263 In eliminating part of the
duplication inherent in recovering sums from both the tortfeasor
and a collateral source, the Bernier court held that the provision
did not diminish the plaintiff's recovery but only reduced the
amount of the recovery from the tortfeasor. 26  The court also con-
cluded that the provision was not invalid as special legislation, but
failed to elaborate on this issue.265
The plaintiff also contended that the deduction allowed by sec-
tion 2-1205 conflicted with a federal statute, section 407(a) of the
Social Security Act, which prohibits the transfer or assignment of
any right to future payment.266 In addition, section 407(a) pro-
vides that the moneys paid or payable or rights that exist under the
section are not subject to legal process such as attachment or gar-
nishment.267 The court held that because section 2-1205 did not
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 242-43, 497 N.E.2d at 775.
261. Id. at 243, 497 N.E.2d at 775.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 243-44, 497 N.E.2d at 775. For a recitation of the due process inquiry, see
supra note 254. The Bernier court also noted that the modification of the collateral
source rule did not result in the impairment of contracts. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 243-44,
497 N.E.2d at 775.
264. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 244, 497 N.E.2d at 775.
265. Id. at 243, 497 N.E.2d at 775.
266. Id. at 244-45, 497 N.E.2d at 775 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (Supp. H 1984)).
267. Id. Section 407(a) of the Social Security Act provides: "The right of any person
to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at
law or equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this sub-
chapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal pro-
cess. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
The plaintiff argued that the law cannot exist under the Supremacy Clause of the
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* pertain to the attachment of social security benefits,2 6 there was no
conflict between the two provisions.269 In upholding this modifica-
tion of the collateral source rule, the Bernier court has derogated
more than a century of common law tradition.
D. Punitive Damages
The plaintiff in Bernier also challenged the provision of the Act
that prohibits awards of punitive damages in actions for healing art
or legal malpractice. 7 0 The circuit court judge found that this pro-
vision violated the rights to due process and equal protection, and
that it constituted special legislation.271
The supreme court, however, determined that such prohibitions
were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and
therefore, constitutional.272 The court noted that more severe limi-
tations had been upheld and that the avoidance of excessive liabil-
ity was a legitimate interest of the legislature.273  The Illinois
Supreme Court previously had held limits on the recovery of com-
pensatory damages in medical malpractice actions invalid as spe-
cial legislation.2 74  This holding, however, did not require that
punitive damages be available in every case. 275 The purposes of the
two damage awards are quite different: punitive damages are in-
tended to punish, while compensatory damages are intended to
compensate.276
The supreme court in Bernier held that the elimination of
United States Constitution. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 244, 497 N.E.2d at 775 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2).
268. The court held that section 2-1205 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not per-
tain to the attachment of social security benefits under a set-off system. Bernier, 113
Ill.2d at 244, 497 N.E.2d at 775.
269. Id. The Bernier court recognized that the collateral source rule is of common
law origin and therefore could be changed statutorily. Id.
270. Id. at 245, 497 N.E.2d at 776 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115
(1985)). Section 2-1115 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]n all cases,
whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages by reason of
legal, medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, no punitive, exemplary, vindic-
tive or aggravated damages shall be allowed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115
(1985).
271. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 245, 497 N.E.2d at 776.
272. Id. at 245-46, 497 N.E.2d at 776 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d 594
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Lin v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 878 (1981)).
For an explanation of the equal protection and due process inquiries, see supra note 254.
273. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 246, 497 N.E.2d at 776.
274. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 246, 497 N.E.2d 776 (citing Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 329-30,
347 N.E.2d at 746).
275. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 246, 497 N.E.2d 776.
276. Id.
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awards for punitive damages in medical malpractice actions served
the legislative goals of reducing damages against the medical pro-
fession. 7 Therefore, the court held that this provision did not vio-
late equal protection or due process, nor did it constitute special
legislation. The supreme court, however, failed to elaborate on this
holding.278
E. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff Bernier further challenged the provision that establishes
a sliding scale for the contingent fees an attorney may receive for
representing a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action. 279  The
provision defines a contingent fee as "any fee arrangement under
which the compensation is to be determined in whole or in part on
the result obtained. ' 28 0 Under section 2-1114 of the Act, such fees
cannot exceed one-third of the first $150,000 recovered, one-fourth
of the next $850,000 recovered, and one-fifth of any amount over
$1,000,000 recovered.8 1 In addition, the section provides that a
court may review the contingent fee arrangements for fairness.8 2
In circumstances in which an attorney has put forth an unusual
amount of effort or performed an extraordinary service, the attor-
ney may, upon the court's approval, receive additional
277. Id.
278. Id. at 246-47, 497 N.E.2d at 776. Section 2-1115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
also was challenged on the grounds that it violated the single-subject requirement con-
tained in the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 247, 497 N.E.2d at 776 (citing ILL. CONST. art.
IV, § 8(d)). Article IV, section 8(d) of the constitution provides that "[b]ills, except for
appropriations and for codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined
to one subject." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d). The plaintiff in Bernier argued that because
the provision concerns actions for both healing art malpractice and legal malpractice, it
pertained to more than one subject. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 247, 497 N.E.2d at 776. The
supreme court responded that the single-subject clause prohibited "discordant" provi-
sions in the same legislation. Id. at 247, 497 N.E.2d at 777. Because the Code of Civil
Procedure could contain separate prohibitions of awards of punitive damages in medical
malpractice actions and legal malpractice actions, the court held that their presence to-
gether in the same provision did not offend the single-subject requirement. Id. at 248, 497
N.E.2d at 777 (citing Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Il1. 2d 196, 209-11, 417 N.E.2d 1336, 1343
(1981)).
279. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 248, 497 N.E.2d at 777 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1114 (1985)).
280. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 248, 497 N.E.2d at 777 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1114(a) (1985)).
281. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 248, 497 N.E.2d at 777 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1114(a) (1985)). The statute also provided that "in determining any lump sum
contingent fee, any future damages recoverable by the plaintiff in periodic installments
shall be reduced to a lump sum value. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1114(b) (1985).
282. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 248, 497 N.E.2d at 777 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-1114(c) (1985)).
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compensation.28 3
The plaintiff contended that with section 2-1114 the legislature
had made an unconstitutional attempt to regulate the legal profes-
sion.21 4  The supreme court, however, rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment.285 The court reasoned that because the trial court had the
discretion to approve larger fees when appropriate, the provision
did not limit the scope of a court's authority over attorney activi-
ties.286 Therefore, the court held that the provision was not an un-
constitutional attempt to regulate the legal profession.287
The plaintiff also argued that section 2-1114 violated equal pro-
tection and constituted special legislation.288 Plaintiff's argued
that litigants in cases not relating to medical malpractice are free to
pay their attorney any fee they desire. 2 9 The court stated that the
goal of the legislation was to reduce the problems in the health
2901 oevprofession allegedly caused by the malpractice crisis. Moreover,
the supreme court noted that the legislature reasonably may have
believed that placing a limit on attorney fees would have the three
following effects: 1) to expedite the dispute resolution; 2) to deter
the filing of frivolous suits; and 3) to preserve a greater part of
plaintiff's recovery. 291 Thus, the supreme court in Bernier held
that the limits on fees were rationally related to these desired ef-
fects and therefore constitutional.292
The limitation on attorney's fees may foreclose the right of some
disadvantaged victims to a jury trial in medical negligence cases.
In particular, the limitation will make it more difficult for victims
to engage counsel with the expertise and financial resources neces-
sary to prosecute complex and difficult cases.
283. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 248-49, 497 N.E.2d at 777 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1114(c) (1985)).
284. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 250, 497 N.E. 2d at 778.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. The court also held that section 2-1114 did not violate due process or limit
litigants' access to the courts because the statute's restrictions are not severe. Id. at 252-
53, 497 N.E.2d at 779 (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12). Furthermore, the statute con-
tained a special provision allowing for greater than normal compensation when the cir-
cumstances warrant. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 252, 497 N.E.2d at 779 (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1114(c) (1985)).
288. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 252, 497 N.E.2d at 779.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 252-534, 497 N.E.2d at 779. For explanation of inquiry under due process
and equal protection challenges, see supra note 254.
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V. STRUCTURAL WORK ACT
Three supreme court cases decided during the Survey year will
have a major impact on future actions under the Structural Work
Act (the "Act"). 293  In Innis v. Elmhurst Dodge, Inc.,294 the
supreme court continued its recent trend of strictly construing the
statute in determining what structures are covered by the Act.
This restrictive approach is contrary to the long standing liberal
interpretation utilized to protect persons involved in ex-
trahazardous occupations. In the other two cases, Prewein v. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co. 295 and Hollis v. R. Latoria Construction Co. ,296
the supreme court determined the role of comparative fault in ac-
tions brought under the Act.
A. Determination of a Structure
The Act states that all ladders erected by any person, firm, or
corporation for use in repairing a structure must be erected in a
safe manner. 297 The ladders also must be placed and operated in
such a manner that those who use them in the course of their em-
ployment are adequately protected. 29s Further, the Act provides
injured persons a right to recover for a tortfeasor's wilful viola-
tions299 of the Act or wilful failure to comply with its provisions a.3 °
In Innis, the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries allegedly re-
ceived during a fall from a ladder in the defendant's service depart-
ment.30 1 The accident occurred while the plaintiff was repairing air
compressors that rested on an elevated concrete platform.30 2 The
293. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1979).
294. 107 Ill. 2d 151, 481 N.E.2d 709 (1985).
295. 108 Ill. 2d 141, 483 N.E.2d 224 (1985).
296. 108 Ill. 2d 401, 485 N.E.2d 4 (1985).
297. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para 60 (1985).
298. The Structural Work Act provides in relevant part:
That [sic] all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechan-
ical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in
this State for the use in erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of
any house, building, bridge, viaduct or other structure shall be so erected and
constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to
life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged.
Id.
299. See Dickmann v. Midwest Interstate Elec. Constr. Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d 494, 493
N.E.2d 33 (1st Dist. 1986) (question of whether defendant's opportunity to discover the
dangerous condition constituted a wilful violation of the Structural Work Act was an
issue of material fact).
300. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 69 (1985).
301. Innis, 107 Ill. 2d at 153, 481 N.E.2d at 710.
302. Id.
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plaintiff claimed that the air-compressors came within the meaning
of "structure" for the purpose of alleging liability under the Struc-
tural Work Act.3 °a The supreme court disagreed, holding that the
air compressors were nothing more than movable pieces of equip-
ment which the Act did not cover. 3°
The court noted that the Act covered ladders used to perform an
activity upon a "house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other struc-
ture. ' 30 5 Therefore, the issue before the Innis court was whether
the "other structure" category of the Act encompassed the air
compressors. 306
The court determined that the other structures included those
"structures of the general type specified therein. "307 Because the
air compressors were nothing more than movable pieces of equip-
ment, the court considered them dissimilar from houses, buildings,
bridges, and viaducts.30 8 The supreme court in Innis declined to
extend the Act to cover air compressors or other movable
equipment.309
303. Id. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment at the trial court level.
The Circuit Court of Cook County granted defendant's motion, finding that the Act did
not cover the air-compressor equipment. The appellate court reversed and remanded for
further determination on the merits. Id.
304. Id. at 156, 481 N.E.2d at 711. See also Gill v. Parcable, 138 Ill. App. 3d 409,
485 N.E.2d 1215 (5th Dist. 1985) (attaching cable TV wires to electric utility pole not
covered by Act because regardless of whether pole classified as a structure, decedent's
task did not relate to electrical system); Smrynrotis v. Brokob Constr. Co., 142 Ill. App.
3d 340, 491 N.E.2d 1246 (1st Dist. 1986) (Act inapplicable when plaintiff injured by
contact with overhead powerline while working on roof of building because injury was
not a result of the roof's failure to support and the occurrence was not the type of ex-
trahazardous risk covered by the Act.)
305. Innis, 107 Ill. 2d at 155, 481 N.E.2d at 711 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para.
69 (1985)). See supra note 298.
306. Innis, 107 Ill. 2d at 155, 481 N.E.2d at 711. The court noted that the Act
should be given liberal interpretation in order to effectuate protection of persons engaged
in extrahazardous occupations. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 155-56, 481 N.E.2d at 711.
309. Id. at 156, 481 N.E.2d at 711. The Innis court observed that the importance of a
piece of equipment is irrelevant for a determination of whether the item is a structure
under the Act. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Simon stated that the majority's narrow interpreta-
tion of the Act failed to support the Act's principle of "broad protection to working
men." Id. at 157-58, 481 N.E.2d at 712 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon's opinion
was based on the court's recent decision in Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d
444, 483 N.E.2d 946 (1984), in which the court set out a broad definition of "structure."
Innis, 107 Ill. 2d at 157, 481 N.E.2d at 712 (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing Simmons, 104
Ill. 2d 444, 483 N.E.2d 946).
B. Comparative Fault
Comparative fault does not apply to claims made under the
Structural Work Act.31 ° In Prewein,1 the supreme court ad-
dressed two different factual situations. In one, the plaintiff alleged
that, while employed as an iron worker, he was injured when a
hydraulic lift he was using for support toppled.31 2 In the other, the
plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the concrete slab on
which he was standing collapsed. 13 Both complaints alleged that
the injuries occurred as a result of violations of the Act.31 4 In re-
sponse to both complaints, the defendants alleged that the plain-
tiff's own negligence contributed to the accidents and any damages
awarded should be reduced by the degree to which the defendants
were at fault.315
In Prewein, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that it previously
held that comparative fault did not apply to claims brought under
the Act.31 6 Under that prior decision, a plaintiff's alleged fault
must be disregarded in order to provide complete protection for
construction workers as the legislature intended.31 Further, the
Prewein court noted that the Act was intended to place full respon-
sibility on "the person in charge, ' 318 while eliminating an em-
ployee's contributory negligence as a defense. 319 Accordingly, the
supreme court in Prewein held that a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence does not apply to claims made under the Act and therefore
will not reduce the damages awarded.32 °
The role of comparative fault in a cause of action under the Act
also was considered by the Illinois Supreme Court in Hollis.32 1 The
310. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 146, 483 N.E.2d at 226.
311. Id. at 141, 483 N.E.2d at 224.
312. Id. at 143, 483 N.E.2d at 224.
313. Id. at 144, 483 N.E.2d at 225.
314. Id. at 143-44, 483 N.E.2d at 224-25.
315. Id. at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225. The petitions for leave to appeal in both cases
were allowed prior to the supreme court's decision in Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104
Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946 (1984). Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225.
316. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225 (citing Simmons, 104 Ill. 2d 444,
473 N.E.2d 946)). See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
317. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225 (citing Simmons, 104 Ill. 2d at
461, 473 N.E.2d at 954).
318. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225 (citing Bryntesen v. Carroll Con-
struction Co., 27 Ill. 2d 566, 569, 190 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1963)).
319. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 145, 483 N.E.2d at 225. See also Mathieu v. Venture
Stores, Inc., 144 Ill. App. 3d 783, 494 N.E.2d 806 (1st Dist. 1986) (improper scheduling
of work barred safest method of performing work and constituted violation of Structural
Work Act and proximate cause of injury).
320. Prewein, 108 Ill. 2d at 146, 483 N.E.2d at 226.
321. Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d 401, 485 N.E.2d 4.
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court again held that a plaintiff's conduct is not a factor in an ac-
tion brought under the Act.322 In Hollis, the plaintiff filed an action
under the Act323 for injuries sustained while working as a roofer.324
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.325 The appellate court,
however, held the award to be inadequate and therefore reversed
and remanded it to the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of
damages.326
On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant contended that
the verdict resulted from "a compromise by the jury on the issue of
liability. ' 327 The plaintiff responded that the defendant's closing
argument contained references to the plaintiff's alleged negligence
and that these references caused the jury to reduce improperly the
amount of damages awarded. 328  At trial, the plaintiff's attorney
objected to those references and argued that they were contrary to
the terms of the Act. 329
The supreme court determined that the jury's inadequate award
resulted from the defense attorney's improper argument that the
plaintiff contributed to his own injuries.330 The court concluded
that the plaintiff's conduct was not a factor to consider, but instead
the only consideration was whether the defendant's conduct made
him culpable. 3 Therefore, the court remanded the case.332 Be-
cause the issues of liability and damages are separate and distinct,
322. Id. at 411, 485 N.E.2d at 8.
323. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 60-69 (1985).
324. Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d at 403, 485 N.E.2d at 4.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 403, 485 N.E.2d at 4-5. The supreme court determined that the appellate
court did not err in substituting its judgment for that of the jury when it held the damages
inadequate. Id. at 408, 485 N.E.2d at 7. Having judged that the damages awarded were
inadequate, it was necessary to determine whether a new trial on all issues, or solely on
damages, was warranted. Id.
327. Id. at 409, 485 N.E.2d at 7.
328. Id. During closing argument, despite several objections by the plaintiff's attor-
ney, the trial court allowed the defendants' attorney to argue that the plaintiff's negligent
conduct was a contributing cause of his own injuries. Id. at 409, 485 N.E.2d at 7.
329. Id. The court noted that in 1981, the time of the trial, neither a plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence nor assumption of risk bar plaintiff's recovery in an action under the
Structural Work Act. Id. at 410, 485 N.E.2d at 8 (citing Barthel v. Illinois Central R.R.
Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213, 384 N.E.2d 323 (1978); Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific Ry. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961); Smith v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 86
Ill. App. 3d 570, 408 N.E.2d 117 (1980)).
330. Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d at 411, 485 N.E.2d at 8.
331. Id. The evidence showed that the defendant was "in charge of" the construc-
tion, that he wilfully violated the Act, and that the violation was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff did not need to demonstrate anything else to estab-
lish liability. Id. at 410-11, 485 N.E.2d at 8. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
332. Hollis, 108 I11. 2d at 411, 485 N.E.2d at 8.
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the supreme court directed that the court retrying the case be con-
cerned only with a determination of the damages. 333
Justice Ryan, writing in dissent, stated that the case should have
been remanded on all issues, not only on the question of dam-
ages.334 Justice Ryan asserted that the defendant's argument was
not that the plaintiff's conduct, along with other factors, contrib-
uted to his injury, but that plaintiff's conduct was the only proxi-
mate cause of the injury.335 In the dissenter's opinion, the
majority's statement that the defendant's conduct was the sole con-
sideration was too broad.33 6 Justice Ryan further stated that if the
plaintiff's conduct was the proximate cause of his injury, defendant
should have been free from liability.337
Justice Ryan thus considered the jury's verdict "a compromise
between those who thought the plaintiff's conduct was the sole
proximate cause of his injury and those who felt that the defend-
ant's culpable conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. "338 Be-
cause there was evidence in the record for both sides, Justice Ryan
stated that the case should have been remanded on all issues. 339
The supreme court in Prewein determined that fault of the em-
ployee is no defense in either the liability or damage portion of the
trial. Plaintiff's limine motions, objections, and instructions
should reflect these decisions. It remains unclear whether the in-
jured party's conduct is admissible with regard to the issue of prox-
imate cause.
VI. DRAM SHOP ACT
Injuries caused by intoxicated individuals have been a great con-
cern both to Illinois' courts and the legislature.3" The legislative
333. Id.
334. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
335. Id. at 411, 485 N.E.2d at 9. (Ryan, J., dissenting). See also Quinlin v. North-
western Steel & Wire Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 535, 487 N.E.2d 1125 (1st Dist. 1985) (Struc-
tural Work Act not violated when injury to plaintiff working on a roof deck resulted from
wind-blown metal sheeting stored on roof rather than a defect in the roof supporting
plaintiff).
336. Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d at 412, 485 N.E.2d at 9. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 413, 485 N.E.2d at 9 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). If a
defendant's culpable conduct is found to be a proximate cause, liability will attach under
the Act. Id. at 412, 485 N.E.2d at 9 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 413, 485 N.E.2d at 9 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
340. The new Illinois statutes manifest the concern for victims of intoxicated individ-
uals. Under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 1-203.1 (1985), the circuit court may with-
draw a person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle without a hearing. The
basis for this withdrawal of driving privileges is the individual's refusal to submit to a
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response to this concern was the enactment of the Dram Shop
Act.341 During the past year, the courts have clarified certain as-
pects of the Act,342 resulting in legislative amendments.
343
Under common law, no cause of action existed against a tavern
or tavernkeeper who sold intoxicating beverages to a patron who
later causes damages. 344 The theory was that the act of the pur-
chaser caused the damages, rather than the act of the seller.345
Under the Dram Shop Act, the plaintiff has a statutory remedy
against a tavern or tavernkeeper when his injuries are caused by
the intoxication of the buyer and the sale has caused or contributed
to such intoxication.346 Because the statute involves strict liability,
the plaintiff is not required to prove the negligent sale of the
liquor.347
A. Liability
The Illinois Dram Shop Act 348 applies to sales of liquor by Illi-
chemical test following an arrest for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, or submission to such tests indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.
Id.
The suspension for refusal to submit to chemical tests to determine alcohol or drug
concentration is six months from the effective date of the statutory summary suspension.
If an individual submits to the tests and registers an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more, the suspension is three months from the effective date of the statutory summary
suspension. A one year suspension from the effective date of the statutory summary sus-
pension is required for any person other than a first offender. Id. at para. 6-208.1.
341. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1985).
342. See infra notes 348, 355 and accompanying text.
343. "The Liquor Control Act of 1934" has been amended in the following manner:
For all causes of action involving persons injured, killed or incurring property damage
after the effective date of the Act, the limitation on the judgment or recovery for injury to
the person or property is raised to $30,000 per person and for loss of means of support
resulting from the death or injury of any person is raised to $40,000; separate claims
which, in the aggregate, exceed any one limit in instances where one person incurs more
than one type of compensable damage may be brought; all persons claiming loss to means
of support (from death of or injury to a person) shall be limited to an aggregate recovery
of $40,000; and actions for injuries to the person or property of the intoxicated person
himself or for any person claiming to be supported by such intoxicated person are prohib-
ited. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 43, para. 135 (1985).
344. See, e.g., Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P. 2d 952 (3d Dist. 1943);
Hyba v. C.A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (2d Dist. 1939).
345. Hitson, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (3d Dist. 1943).
346. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (5th ed. 1979).
347. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (2d ed. 1984).
348. Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 108 Ill. 2d 435 440-41, 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1985)
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para 135 (1981)). See also Graham v. General U. S.
Grant Post No. 2664, V.F.W., 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969) (Act held inapplicable
to an accident that occurred in Wisconsin after the sale of liquor by an Illinois
tavernkeeper in Illinois).
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nois tavernkeepers for injuries sustained in Illinois.349 The Illinois
Supreme Court recently held that a third party who is injured in
Illinois after a sale of liquor by a tavernkeeper in Wisconsin has no
cause of action under the Illinois Dram Shop Act.35 °
In Wimmer v. Koenigseder,51 the supreme court stated that the
Illinois Dram Shop Act was important because it specifically regu-
lated the sale of liquor by Illinois tavernkeepers to Illinois pa-
trons.3 52 The supreme court in Wimmer also recognized that the
Illinois courts frequently have announced that no common law lia-
bility for negligent sale of liquor exists in Illinois.3 53
Following Wimmer, increases in the statutory damage awards
are to no avail for third parties injured in Illinois after liquor sales
to drivers by Wisconsin tavernkeepers. In refusing to expand the
Dram Shop Act protection extraterritorially, the court in Wimmer
has limited the negligent parties from which a plaintiff may seek
redress. This judicial decision may prompt legislative response
from federal and state bodies.
B. Contribution
A dram shop that contributes to the intoxication of a patron
who later injures a third party is not liable in tort for purposes of
an action for contribution.354 Therefore, contribution does not ap-
ply to dram shop actions.355
349. Wimmer, 108 Ill. 2d at 444, 484 N.E.2d at 1093. Wisconsin has no dram shop
statute, nor any common law action in tort against a tavernkeeper who sells liquor to an
intoxicated patron who later injures a third party. Id. at 440, 484 N.E.2d at 1091 (citing
Hennes v. Lock Ness Bar, 117 Wis. 2d 397, 344 N.W.2d 205 (1983); Olsen v. Copeland,
90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176
N.W.2d 566 (1970)). Olsen and Garcia subsequently were overruled by Sorenson v.
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) ("vendor who negligently supplies intox-
icating beverages to a minor and the intoxicants so furnished cause the minor to be intox-
icated or cause the minor's driving ability to be impaired shall be liable to third persons in
the proportion that the negligence in selling the beverage was a substantial factor in caus-
ing the accident or injuries as determined under the rules of comparative negligence").
350. Wimmer, 108 Ill. 2d at 442, 484 N.E.2d at 1092. The court commented that
nothing in the statute reflected legislative intent to extend the statute to Wisconsin
tavernkeepers. Id.
351. 108 Ill. 2d 435, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (1985).
352. Id. (citing Graham 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657). See supra note 348.
353. Wimmer, 108 Ill.2d at 442, 484 N.E.2d at 1092 (citing Demchuk v. Duplancick,
92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157
(1961)).
354. Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill. 2d 206, 211, 497 N.E.2d 757, 759 (1986).
355. Id. at 212, 497 N.E.2d at 760. The statutory provisions relevant to the resolu-
tion of the issue presented in this case were section 6-21 of the Liquor Control Act of
1934 and section 2(a) of the Contribution Act. Id. at 209, 497 N.E.2d at 758. Section 6-
21 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 provides in relevant part: "[e]very person who is
1986]
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In Hopkins v. Powers,356 the plaintiff, after consuming intoxicat-
ing beverages at the defendant-tavern, lost control of his automo-
bile and damaged various properties.357 After settling with all
claimants, the plaintiff filed suit seeking contribution from the tav-
ern for that portion of the total settlement proportionate to the
tavern's relative culpability. 38 The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that "dram shop
liability is not tort liability and, therefore, a dram shop cannot be
liable in tort for purposes of contribution. ' 359
On appeal to the supreme court, the tavern contended that the
Dram Shop Act did not create a statutory duty in tort that would
allow the plaintiff to obtain contribution. 360 Further, the defendant
noted that in Illinois there was no common law duty to this ef-
fect.3 61 In the absence of either a statutory or common law duty,
the defendant concluded that he could not be "liable in tort" for
purposes of contribution as required by the Contribution Act.362
The supreme court in Hopkins agreed with defendant's conten-
tions.363 There was no common law duty of tavernkeepers in Wis-
consin or Illinois to refrain from serving liquor to patrons who, as
a result of their intoxication, injure third parties.3" Thus, the court
held that the defendant tavernkeeper was not "liable in tort" for
purposes of the Contribution Act.365
The court in Hopkins also discussed the class of persons who
may bring actions under the Dram Shop Act.3 66 The court as-
injured in person or property by an intoxicated person, has a right of action in his or her
own name, generally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic
liquor, causes the intoxication of such person." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1985).
Section 2(a) of the Contribution Act read as follows: "[w]here two or more persons are
subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, there is a
right of contribution among them, even though, judgment has not been entered against
any or all of them." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (1983).
356. 113 Ill. 2d 206, 497 N.E.2d 757.
357. Id. at 209, 497 N.E.2d at 758.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 210, 497 N.E.2d at 759.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. The supreme court in Hopkins based its holding on a recent supreme court
decision in which the court held the Illinois Dram Shop Act applies to sales of liquor by
Illinois tavernkeepers for injuries sustained in Illinois. Id. (citing Wimmer, 108 Ill. 2d
435, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (1985)). See supra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
364. Hopkins, 113 I11. 2d at 211, 497 N.E.2d at 759.
365. Id. The court noted that the defendant's liability was limited to the exclusive
nontort liability of the Dram Shop Act. Id.
366. Id.
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serted that recovery under the Act was limited to innocent third
parties who are injured as a result of the sale of liquor. 367 Because
the plaintiff in Hopkins had admitted liability, the court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Act.368
In Hopkins, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that dram shop
liability is not tort liability for the purpose of the Contribution Act.
Thus, liquor selling establishments are sheltered from contribution
even though they could have been liable had the plaintiff originally
sued them under the Dram Shop Act. The decision in Hopkins is a
clear departure from earlier decisions holding that dram shop lia-
bility sounds in tort.369 Not allowing contribution when plaintiff's
fault is at issue is reminiscent of the procedural outcomes of the
discarded law of contributory negligence.37° Moreover, the Hop-
kins decision may be viewed as undercutting legislative and social
policy that promotes responsible conduct by tavernkeepers.
VII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, the Illinois judicial system applied the
doctrine of comparative fault in a variety of situations. In some
cases, the courts resorted to the abolition of certain doctrines; in
others, the courts simply clarified their scope and effect. In all in-
stances, the courts simplified and clarified the judicial process.
367. Id. at 211, 497 N.E.2d at 759. In his dissent, Justice Simon stated that the
majority undercut legislative policy by allowing the tavern to avoid contribution when it
could have been liable had the plaintiff originally sued it under the Dram Shop Act. Id.
at 214-19, 497 N.E.2d at 760-63 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon opined that "the
majority's decision was motivated by their desire to deal harshly with those individuals
who drink and drive... ", but noted that only liquor-selling establishments will benefit
by the decision in Hopkins. Id. at 218-19, 497 N.E.2d at 763 (Simon, J., dissenting). See
also Reeves v. Beno Inc., 138 I11. App. 3d 861, 486 N.E.2d 405 (2d Dist. 1985) (plaintiff
should not recover in proportion to his degree of fault when found guilty of complicity in
the inebriate's intoxication).
368. Hopkins, 113 Ill. 2d at 212, 497 N.E.2d at 759.
369. Id. at 215, 497 N.E.2d at 760 (Simon, J., dissenting). See also Dworak v. Tem-
pel, 17 Ill. 2d 181, 161 N.E.2d 258 (1959) (when liable under the Act, dram shop owners
and operators are considered "statutory tortfeasors"); Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87
(1905) (violation of dram shop statute is a "tortious act").
370. For further discussion of contributory negligence, see supra notes 22-28 and ac-
companying text.
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